/* * Creating audit events from TTY input. * * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. This copyrighted * material is made available to anyone wishing to use, modify, copy, or * redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General * Public License v.2. * * Authors: Miloslav Trmac */ #include #include #include struct tty_audit_buf { struct mutex mutex; /* Protects all data below */ dev_t dev; /* The TTY which the data is from */ unsigned icanon:1; size_t valid; unsigned char *data; /* Allocated size N_TTY_BUF_SIZE */ }; static struct tty_audit_buf *tty_audit_buf_ref(void) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; buf = current->signal->tty_audit_buf; WARN_ON(buf == ERR_PTR(-ESRCH)); return buf; } static struct tty_audit_buf *tty_audit_buf_alloc(void) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; buf = kmalloc(sizeof(*buf), GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) goto err; buf->data = kmalloc(N_TTY_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf->data) goto err_buf; mutex_init(&buf->mutex); buf->dev = MKDEV(0, 0); buf->icanon = 0; buf->valid = 0; return buf; err_buf: kfree(buf); err: return NULL; } static void tty_audit_buf_free(struct tty_audit_buf *buf) { WARN_ON(buf->valid != 0); kfree(buf->data); kfree(buf); } static void tty_audit_log(const char *description, dev_t dev, unsigned char *data, size_t size) { struct audit_buffer *ab; struct task_struct *tsk = current; pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(tsk)); uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk); ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TTY); if (ab) { char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; audit_log_format(ab, "%s pid=%u uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u major=%d" " minor=%d comm=", description, pid, uid, loginuid, sessionid, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev)); get_task_comm(name, tsk); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); audit_log_format(ab, " data="); audit_log_n_hex(ab, data, size); audit_log_end(ab); } } /** * tty_audit_buf_push - Push buffered data out * * Generate an audit message from the contents of @buf, which is owned by * the current task. @buf->mutex must be locked. */ static void tty_audit_buf_push(struct tty_audit_buf *buf) { if (buf->valid == 0) return; if (audit_enabled == 0) { buf->valid = 0; return; } tty_audit_log("tty", buf->dev, buf->data, buf->valid); buf->valid = 0; } /** * tty_audit_exit - Handle a task exit * * Make sure all buffered data is written out and deallocate the buffer. * Only needs to be called if current->signal->tty_audit_buf != %NULL. * * The process is single-threaded at this point; no other threads share * current->signal. */ void tty_audit_exit(void) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; buf = xchg(¤t->signal->tty_audit_buf, ERR_PTR(-ESRCH)); if (!buf) return; tty_audit_buf_push(buf); tty_audit_buf_free(buf); } /** * tty_audit_fork - Copy TTY audit state for a new task * * Set up TTY audit state in @sig from current. @sig needs no locking. */ void tty_audit_fork(struct signal_struct *sig) { sig->audit_tty = current->signal->audit_tty; } /** * tty_audit_tiocsti - Log TIOCSTI */ void tty_audit_tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char ch) { dev_t dev; dev = MKDEV(tty->driver->major, tty->driver->minor_start) + tty->index; if (tty_audit_push()) return; if (audit_enabled) tty_audit_log("ioctl=TIOCSTI", dev, &ch, 1); } /** * tty_audit_push - Flush current's pending audit data * * Returns 0 if success, -EPERM if tty audit is disabled */ int tty_audit_push(void) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; if (~current->signal->audit_tty & AUDIT_TTY_ENABLE) return -EPERM; buf = tty_audit_buf_ref(); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(buf)) { mutex_lock(&buf->mutex); tty_audit_buf_push(buf); mutex_unlock(&buf->mutex); } return 0; } /** * tty_audit_buf_get - Get an audit buffer. * * Get an audit buffer, allocate it if necessary. Return %NULL * if out of memory or ERR_PTR(-ESRCH) if tty_audit_exit() has already * occurred. Otherwise, return a new reference to the buffer. */ static struct tty_audit_buf *tty_audit_buf_get(void) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; buf = tty_audit_buf_ref(); if (buf) return buf; buf = tty_audit_buf_alloc(); if (buf == NULL) { audit_log_lost("out of memory in TTY auditing"); return NULL; } /* Race to use this buffer, free it if another wins */ if (cmpxchg(¤t->signal->tty_audit_buf, NULL, buf) != NULL) tty_audit_buf_free(buf); return tty_audit_buf_ref(); } /** * tty_audit_add_data - Add data for TTY auditing. * * Audit @data of @size from @tty, if necessary. */ void tty_audit_add_data(struct tty_struct *tty, const void *data, size_t size) { struct tty_audit_buf *buf; unsigned int icanon = !!L_ICANON(tty); unsigned int audit_tty; dev_t dev; audit_tty = READ_ONCE(current->signal->audit_tty); if (~audit_tty & AUDIT_TTY_ENABLE) return; if (unlikely(size == 0)) return; if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY && tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER) return; if ((~audit_tty & AUDIT_TTY_LOG_PASSWD) && icanon && !L_ECHO(tty)) return; buf = tty_audit_buf_get(); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(buf)) return; mutex_lock(&buf->mutex); dev = MKDEV(tty->driver->major, tty->driver->minor_start) + tty->index; if (buf->dev != dev || buf->icanon != icanon) { tty_audit_buf_push(buf); buf->dev = dev; buf->icanon = icanon; } do { size_t run; run = N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - buf->valid; if (run > size) run = size; memcpy(buf->data + buf->valid, data, run); buf->valid += run; data += run; size -= run; if (buf->valid == N_TTY_BUF_SIZE) tty_audit_buf_push(buf); } while (size != 0); mutex_unlock(&buf->mutex); } /cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/Documentation/thermal?id=1342e0b7a6c1a060c593037fbac9f4b717f1cb3b'>1342e0b7a6c1a060c593037fbac9f4b717f1cb3b (diff)
Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-20160418' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent
Pull a perf/urgent fix from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo: - Fix segfault tracing transactions in Intel PT (Adrian Hunter) Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/thermal')
handle_mm_fault() for autonuma to deal with. The case of pages that are really not executable is handled by the existing test for VM_EXEC further down. That leaves us with catching the kernel attempts at executing user pages. We can catch that earlier, even before we do find_vma. It is never valid on powerpc for the kernel to take an exec fault to begin with. So fold that test with the existing test for the kernel faulting on kernel addresses to bail out early. Fixes: 1d18ad026844 ("powerpc/mm: Detect instruction fetch denied and report") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c')