/* * xenfs.c - a filesystem for passing info between the a domain and * the hypervisor. * * 2008-10-07 Alex Zeffertt Replaced /proc/xen/xenbus with xenfs filesystem * and /proc/xen compatibility mount point. * Turned xenfs into a loadable module. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xenfs.h" #include "../privcmd.h" #include "../xenbus/xenbus_comms.h" #include MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Xen filesystem"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); static ssize_t capabilities_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *off) { char *tmp = ""; if (xen_initial_domain()) tmp = "control_d\n"; return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, off, tmp, strlen(tmp)); } static const struct file_operations capabilities_file_ops = { .read = capabilities_read, .llseek = default_llseek, }; static int xenfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) { static struct tree_descr xenfs_files[] = { [2] = { "xenbus", &xen_xenbus_fops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, { "capabilities", &capabilities_file_ops, S_IRUGO }, { "privcmd", &xen_privcmd_fops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, {""}, }; static struct tree_descr xenfs_init_files[] = { [2] = { "xenbus", &xen_xenbus_fops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, { "capabilities", &capabilities_file_ops, S_IRUGO }, { "privcmd", &xen_privcmd_fops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, { "xsd_kva", &xsd_kva_file_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR}, { "xsd_port", &xsd_port_file_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR}, #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SYMS { "xensyms", &xensyms_ops, S_IRUSR}, #endif {""}, }; return simple_fill_super(sb, XENFS_SUPER_MAGIC, xen_initial_domain() ? xenfs_init_files : xenfs_files); } static struct dentry *xenfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data) { return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, xenfs_fill_super); } static struct file_system_type xenfs_type = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "xenfs", .mount = xenfs_mount, .kill_sb = kill_litter_super, }; MODULE_ALIAS_FS("xenfs"); static int __init xenfs_init(void) { if (xen_domain()) return register_filesystem(&xenfs_type); pr_info("not registering filesystem on non-xen platform\n"); return 0; } static void __exit xenfs_exit(void) { if (xen_domain()) unregister_filesystem(&xenfs_type); } module_init(xenfs_init); module_exit(xenfs_exit); rch' size='10' name='q' value=''/>
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authorBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>2017-02-03 17:10:28 +1100
committerMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>2017-02-08 23:36:29 +1100
commitd7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b (patch)
tree098a7c0ca4fceb8a65cb1f693c9d71990388933d /include/rdma/ib_verbs.h
parenta0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91 (diff)
powerpc/mm: Fix spurrious segfaults on radix with autonuma
When autonuma (Automatic NUMA balancing) marks a PTE inaccessible it clears all the protection bits but leave the PTE valid. With the Radix MMU, an attempt at executing from such a PTE will take a fault with bit 35 of SRR1 set "SRR1_ISI_N_OR_G". It is thus incorrect to treat all such faults as errors. We should pass them to handle_mm_fault() for autonuma to deal with. The case of pages that are really not executable is handled by the existing test for VM_EXEC further down. That leaves us with catching the kernel attempts at executing user pages. We can catch that earlier, even before we do find_vma. It is never valid on powerpc for the kernel to take an exec fault to begin with. So fold that test with the existing test for the kernel faulting on kernel addresses to bail out early. Fixes: 1d18ad026844 ("powerpc/mm: Detect instruction fetch denied and report") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/rdma/ib_verbs.h')