/* * linux/fs/binfmt_script.c * * Copyright (C) 1996 Martin von Löwis * original #!-checking implemented by tytso. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const char *i_arg, *i_name; char *cp; struct file *file; char interp[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE]; int retval; if ((bprm->buf[0] != '#') || (bprm->buf[1] != '!')) return -ENOEXEC; /* * If the script filename will be inaccessible after exec, typically * because it is a "/dev/fd//.." path against an O_CLOEXEC fd, give * up now (on the assumption that the interpreter will want to load * this file). */ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE) return -ENOENT; /* * This section does the #! interpretation. * Sorta complicated, but hopefully it will work. -TYT */ allow_write_access(bprm->file); fput(bprm->file); bprm->file = NULL; bprm->buf[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE - 1] = '\0'; if ((cp = strchr(bprm->buf, '\n')) == NULL) cp = bprm->buf+BINPRM_BUF_SIZE-1; *cp = '\0'; while (cp > bprm->buf) { cp--; if ((*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t')) *cp = '\0'; else break; } for (cp = bprm->buf+2; (*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t'); cp++); if (*cp == '\0') return -ENOEXEC; /* No interpreter name found */ i_name = cp; i_arg = NULL; for ( ; *cp && (*cp != ' ') && (*cp != '\t'); cp++) /* nothing */ ; while ((*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t')) *cp++ = '\0'; if (*cp) i_arg = cp; strcpy (interp, i_name); /* * OK, we've parsed out the interpreter name and * (optional) argument. * Splice in (1) the interpreter's name for argv[0] * (2) (optional) argument to interpreter * (3) filename of shell script (replace argv[0]) * * This is done in reverse order, because of how the * user environment and arguments are stored. */ retval = remove_arg_zero(bprm); if (retval) return retval; retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->interp, bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; bprm->argc++; if (i_arg) { retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &i_arg, bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; bprm->argc++; } retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &i_name, bprm); if (retval) return retval; bprm->argc++; retval = bprm_change_interp(interp, bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; /* * OK, now restart the process with the interpreter's dentry. */ file = open_exec(interp); if (IS_ERR(file)) return PTR_ERR(file); bprm->file = file; retval = prepare_binprm(bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; return search_binary_handler(bprm); } static struct linux_binfmt script_format = { .module = THIS_MODULE, .load_binary = load_script, }; static int __init init_script_binfmt(void) { register_binfmt(&script_format); return 0; } static void __exit exit_script_binfmt(void) { unregister_binfmt(&script_format); } core_initcall(init_script_binfmt); module_exit(exit_script_binfmt); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); 853a14ba4682f820266469979c9297debc05f60c&showmsg=1'>net/sunrpc
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2017-01-31svcrpc: fix oops in absence of krb5 moduleJ. Bruce Fields1-1/+1
Olga Kornievskaia says: "I ran into this oops in the nfsd (below) (4.10-rc3 kernel). To trigger this I had a client (unsuccessfully) try to mount the server with krb5 where the server doesn't have the rpcsec_gss_krb5 module built." The problem is that rsci.cred is copied from a svc_cred structure that gss_proxy didn't properly initialize. Fix that. [120408.542387] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP ... [120408.565724] CPU: 0 PID: 3601 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ #16 [120408.567037] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual = Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015 [120408.569225] task: ffff8800776f95c0 task.stack: ffffc90003d58000 [120408.570483] RIP: 0010:gss_mech_put+0xb/0x20 [auth_rpcgss] ... [120408.584946] ? rsc_free+0x55/0x90 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.585901] gss_proxy_save_rsc+0xb2/0x2a0 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.587017] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x3cc/0x520 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.588257] ? __enqueue_entity+0x6c/0x70 [120408.589101] svcauth_gss_accept+0x391/0xb90 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.590212] ? try_to_wake_up+0x4a/0x360 [120408.591036] ? wake_up_process+0x15/0x20 [120408.592093] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0x12e/0x2d0 [sunrpc] [120408.593177] svc_authenticate+0xe1/0x100 [sunrpc] [120408.594168] svc_process_common+0x203/0x710 [sunrpc] [120408.595220] svc_process+0x105/0x1c0 [sunrpc] [120408.596278] nfsd+0xe9/0x160 [nfsd] [120408.597060] kthread+0x101/0x140 [120408.597734] ? nfsd_destroy+0x60/0x60 [nfsd] [120408.598626] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [120408.599448] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Fixes: 1d658336b05f "SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>