/* cnode related routines for the coda kernel code (C) 1996 Peter Braam */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "coda_linux.h" static inline int coda_fideq(struct CodaFid *fid1, struct CodaFid *fid2) { return memcmp(fid1, fid2, sizeof(*fid1)) == 0; } static const struct inode_operations coda_symlink_inode_operations = { .get_link = page_get_link, .setattr = coda_setattr, }; /* cnode.c */ static void coda_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct coda_vattr *attr) { coda_vattr_to_iattr(inode, attr); if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &coda_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &coda_file_operations; } else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &coda_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &coda_dir_operations; } else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &coda_symlink_inode_operations; inode_nohighmem(inode); inode->i_data.a_ops = &coda_symlink_aops; inode->i_mapping = &inode->i_data; } else init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, huge_decode_dev(attr->va_rdev)); } static int coda_test_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data) { struct CodaFid *fid = (struct CodaFid *)data; struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); return coda_fideq(&cii->c_fid, fid); } static int coda_set_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data) { struct CodaFid *fid = (struct CodaFid *)data; struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); cii->c_fid = *fid; return 0; } struct inode * coda_iget(struct super_block * sb, struct CodaFid * fid, struct coda_vattr * attr) { struct inode *inode; struct coda_inode_info *cii; unsigned long hash = coda_f2i(fid); inode = iget5_locked(sb, hash, coda_test_inode, coda_set_inode, fid); if (!inode) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) { cii = ITOC(inode); /* we still need to set i_ino for things like stat(2) */ inode->i_ino = hash; /* inode is locked and unique, no need to grab cii->c_lock */ cii->c_mapcount = 0; unlock_new_inode(inode); } /* always replace the attributes, type might have changed */ coda_fill_inode(inode, attr); return inode; } /* this is effectively coda_iget: - get attributes (might be cached) - get the inode for the fid using vfs iget - link the two up if this is needed - fill in the attributes */ struct inode *coda_cnode_make(struct CodaFid *fid, struct super_block *sb) { struct coda_vattr attr; struct inode *inode; int error; /* We get inode numbers from Venus -- see venus source */ error = venus_getattr(sb, fid, &attr); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); inode = coda_iget(sb, fid, &attr); if (IS_ERR(inode)) pr_warn("%s: coda_iget failed\n", __func__); return inode; } /* Although we treat Coda file identifiers as immutable, there is one * special case for files created during a disconnection where they may * not be globally unique. When an identifier collision is detected we * first try to flush the cached inode from the kernel and finally * resort to renaming/rehashing in-place. Userspace remembers both old * and new values of the identifier to handle any in-flight upcalls. * The real solution is to use globally unique UUIDs as identifiers, but * retrofitting the existing userspace code for this is non-trivial. */ void coda_replace_fid(struct inode *inode, struct CodaFid *oldfid, struct CodaFid *newfid) { struct coda_inode_info *cii = ITOC(inode); unsigned long hash = coda_f2i(newfid); BUG_ON(!coda_fideq(&cii->c_fid, oldfid)); /* replace fid and rehash inode */ /* XXX we probably need to hold some lock here! */ remove_inode_hash(inode); cii->c_fid = *newfid; inode->i_ino = hash; __insert_inode_hash(inode, hash); } /* convert a fid to an inode. */ struct inode *coda_fid_to_inode(struct CodaFid *fid, struct super_block *sb) { struct inode *inode; unsigned long hash = coda_f2i(fid); if ( !sb ) { pr_warn("%s: no sb!\n", __func__); return NULL; } inode = ilookup5(sb, hash, coda_test_inode, fid); if ( !inode ) return NULL; /* we should never see newly created inodes because we intentionally * fail in the initialization callback */ BUG_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW); return inode; } /* the CONTROL inode is made without asking attributes from Venus */ struct inode *coda_cnode_makectl(struct super_block *sb) { struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb); if (inode) { inode->i_ino = CTL_INO; inode->i_op = &coda_ioctl_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &coda_ioctl_operations; inode->i_mode = 0444; return inode; } return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } authorArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>2017-02-01 17:45:02 +0000 committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-02-01 21:17:49 +0100 commitc8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92 (patch) treed53fbdac9d0781e39a13b2ac6b2bd258cf3b4140 /security/integrity/evm/Makefile parentbf29bddf0417a4783da3b24e8c9e017ac649326f (diff)
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(), after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported. Commit: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices(). Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses, manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults. So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better place for it anyway) Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code (i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally safe. Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/Makefile')