/* * fscrypt_private.h * * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc. * * This contains encryption key functions. * * Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015. */ #ifndef _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H #define _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H #include #define FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE 32 /* Encryption parameters */ #define FS_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE 16 #define FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE 16 #define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32 #define FS_AES_256_CBC_KEY_SIZE 32 #define FS_AES_256_CTS_KEY_SIZE 32 #define FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE 64 #define FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64 #define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX "fscrypt:" #define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE 8 #define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16 /** * Encryption context for inode * * Protector format: * 1 byte: Protector format (1 = this version) * 1 byte: File contents encryption mode * 1 byte: File names encryption mode * 1 byte: Flags * 8 bytes: Master Key descriptor * 16 bytes: Encryption Key derivation nonce */ struct fscrypt_context { u8 format; u8 contents_encryption_mode; u8 filenames_encryption_mode; u8 flags; u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE]; } __packed; #define FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1 1 /* This is passed in from userspace into the kernel keyring */ struct fscrypt_key { u32 mode; u8 raw[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; u32 size; } __packed; /* * A pointer to this structure is stored in the file system's in-core * representation of an inode. */ struct fscrypt_info { u8 ci_data_mode; u8 ci_filename_mode; u8 ci_flags; struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm; struct key *ci_keyring_key; u8 ci_master_key[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; }; #define FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL 0x00000001 #define FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FL 0x00000002 struct fscrypt_completion_result { struct completion completion; int res; }; #define DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr) \ struct fscrypt_completion_result ecr = { \ COMPLETION_INITIALIZER((ecr).completion), 0 } /* crypto.c */ int fscrypt_initialize(unsigned int cop_flags); /* keyinfo.c */ extern int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *); #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */ nux/net-next.git/diff/include/net/inet_frag.h?h=nds-private-remove&id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>diff
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authorBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>2017-02-03 17:10:28 +1100
committerMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>2017-02-08 23:36:29 +1100
commitd7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b (patch)
tree098a7c0ca4fceb8a65cb1f693c9d71990388933d /include/net/inet_frag.h
parenta0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91 (diff)
powerpc/mm: Fix spurrious segfaults on radix with autonuma
When autonuma (Automatic NUMA balancing) marks a PTE inaccessible it clears all the protection bits but leave the PTE valid. With the Radix MMU, an attempt at executing from such a PTE will take a fault with bit 35 of SRR1 set "SRR1_ISI_N_OR_G". It is thus incorrect to treat all such faults as errors. We should pass them to handle_mm_fault() for autonuma to deal with. The case of pages that are really not executable is handled by the existing test for VM_EXEC further down. That leaves us with catching the kernel attempts at executing user pages. We can catch that earlier, even before we do find_vma. It is never valid on powerpc for the kernel to take an exec fault to begin with. So fold that test with the existing test for the kernel faulting on kernel addresses to bail out early. Fixes: 1d18ad026844 ("powerpc/mm: Detect instruction fetch denied and report") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/inet_frag.h')