/*
 *  linux/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2003
 * Ethan Benson <erbenson@alaska.net>
 * partially derived from linux/fs/ext2/ioctl.c
 * Copyright (C) 1993, 1994, 1995
 * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr)
 * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal
 * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI)
 *
 * hfsplus ioctls
 */

#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "hfsplus_fs.h"

/*
 * "Blessing" an HFS+ filesystem writes metadata to the superblock informing
 * the platform firmware which file to boot from
 */
static int hfsplus_ioctl_bless(struct file *file, int __user *user_flags)
{
	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
	struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(inode->i_sb);
	struct hfsplus_vh *vh = sbi->s_vhdr;
	struct hfsplus_vh *bvh = sbi->s_backup_vhdr;
	u32 cnid = (unsigned long)dentry->d_fsdata;

	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return -EPERM;

	mutex_lock(&sbi->vh_mutex);

	/* Directory containing the bootable system */
	vh->finder_info[0] = bvh->finder_info[0] =
		cpu_to_be32(parent_ino(dentry));

	/*
	 * Bootloader. Just using the inode here breaks in the case of
	 * hard links - the firmware wants the ID of the hard link file,
	 * but the inode points at the indirect inode
	 */
	vh->finder_info[1] = bvh->finder_info[1] = cpu_to_be32(cnid);

	/* Per spec, the OS X system folder - same as finder_info[0] here */
	vh->finder_info[5] = bvh->finder_info[5] =
		cpu_to_be32(parent_ino(dentry));

	mutex_unlock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
	return 0;
}

static int hfsplus_ioctl_getflags(struct file *file, int __user *user_flags)
{
	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
	struct hfsplus_inode_info *hip = HFSPLUS_I(inode);
	unsigned int flags = 0;

	if (inode->i_flags & S_IMMUTABLE)
		flags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
	if (inode->i_flags & S_APPEND)
		flags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
	if (hip->userflags & HFSPLUS_FLG_NODUMP)
		flags |= FS_NODUMP_FL;

	return put_user(flags, user_flags);
}

static int hfsplus_ioctl_setflags(struct file *file, int __user *user_flags)
{
	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
	struct hfsplus_inode_info *hip = HFSPLUS_I(inode);
	unsigned int flags, new_fl = 0;
	int err = 0;

	err = mnt_want_write_file(file);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
		err = -EACCES;
		goto out_drop_write;
	}

	if (get_user(flags, user_flags)) {
		err = -EFAULT;
		goto out_drop_write;
	}

	inode_lock(inode);

	if ((flags & (FS_IMMUTABLE_FL|FS_APPEND_FL)) ||
	    inode->i_flags & (S_IMMUTABLE|S_APPEND)) {
		if (!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
			err = -EPERM;
			goto out_unlock_inode;
		}
	}

	/* don't silently ignore unsupported ext2 flags */
	if (flags & ~(FS_IMMUTABLE_FL|FS_APPEND_FL|FS_NODUMP_FL)) {
		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
		goto out_unlock_inode;
	}

	if (flags & FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)
		new_fl |= S_IMMUTABLE;

	if (flags & FS_APPEND_FL)
		new_fl |= S_APPEND;

	inode_set_flags(inode, new_fl, S_IMMUTABLE | S_APPEND);

	if (flags & FS_NODUMP_FL)
		hip->userflags |= HFSPLUS_FLG_NODUMP;
	else
		hip->userflags &= ~HFSPLUS_FLG_NODUMP;

	inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
	mark_inode_dirty(inode);

out_unlock_inode:
	inode_unlock(inode);
out_drop_write:
	mnt_drop_write_file(file);
out:
	return err;
}

long hfsplus_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;

	switch (cmd) {
	case HFSPLUS_IOC_EXT2_GETFLAGS:
		return hfsplus_ioctl_getflags(file, argp);
	case HFSPLUS_IOC_EXT2_SETFLAGS:
		return hfsplus_ioctl_setflags(file, argp);
	case HFSPLUS_IOC_BLESS:
		return hfsplus_ioctl_bless(file, argp);
	default:
		return -ENOTTY;
	}
}
</select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>space:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='ignorews' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>include</option><option value='1'>ignore</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>mode:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='dt' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>unified</option><option value='1'>ssdiff</option><option value='2'>stat only</option></select></td></tr><tr><td/><td class='ctrl'><noscript><input type='submit' value='reload'/></noscript></td></tr></table></form></div><table summary='commit info' class='commit-info'>
<tr><th>author</th><td>Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-02-03 17:10:28 +1100</td></tr>
<tr><th>committer</th><td>Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-02-08 23:36:29 +1100</td></tr>
<tr><th>commit</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/sound/usb?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/patch/sound/usb?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>patch</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><th>tree</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>098a7c0ca4fceb8a65cb1f693c9d71990388933d</a> /<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/sound/usb?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>sound/usb</a></td></tr>
<tr><th>parent</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/sound/usb?id=a0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91'>a0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/sound/usb?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b&amp;id2=a0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91'>diff</a>)</td></tr></table>
<div class='commit-subject'>powerpc/mm: Fix spurrious segfaults on radix with autonuma</div><div class='commit-msg'>When autonuma (Automatic NUMA balancing) marks a PTE inaccessible it
clears all the protection bits but leave the PTE valid.

With the Radix MMU, an attempt at executing from such a PTE will
take a fault with bit 35 of SRR1 set "SRR1_ISI_N_OR_G".

It is thus incorrect to treat all such faults as errors. We should
pass them to handle_mm_fault() for autonuma to deal with. The case
of pages that are really not executable is handled by the existing
test for VM_EXEC further down.

That leaves us with catching the kernel attempts at executing user
pages. We can catch that earlier, even before we do find_vma.

It is never valid on powerpc for the kernel to take an exec fault
to begin with. So fold that test with the existing test for the
kernel faulting on kernel addresses to bail out early.

Fixes: 1d18ad026844 ("powerpc/mm: Detect instruction fetch denied and report")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</div><div class='diffstat-header'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/?id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>Diffstat</a> (limited to 'sound/usb')</div><table summary='diffstat' class='diffstat'>