#include <linux/reiserfs_xattr.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>

struct inode;
struct dentry;
struct iattr;
struct super_block;

int reiserfs_xattr_register_handlers(void) __init;
void reiserfs_xattr_unregister_handlers(void);
int reiserfs_xattr_init(struct super_block *sb, int mount_flags);
int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct super_block *sb);
int reiserfs_delete_xattrs(struct inode *inode);
int reiserfs_chown_xattrs(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attrs);
int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);

#ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR
#define has_xattr_dir(inode) (REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_has_xattr_dir)
ssize_t reiserfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size);

int reiserfs_xattr_get(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
int reiserfs_xattr_set(struct inode *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
int reiserfs_xattr_set_handle(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *,
			      struct inode *, const char *, const void *,
			      size_t, int);

extern const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_user_handler;
extern const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_trusted_handler;
extern const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_security_handler;
#ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
			   const struct qstr *qstr,
			   struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec);
int reiserfs_security_write(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th,
			    struct inode *inode,
			    struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec);
void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec);
#endif

static inline int reiserfs_xattrs_initialized(struct super_block *sb)
{
	return REISERFS_SB(sb)->priv_root != NULL;
}

#define xattr_size(size) ((size) + sizeof(struct reiserfs_xattr_header))
static inline loff_t reiserfs_xattr_nblocks(struct inode *inode, loff_t size)
{
	loff_t ret = 0;
	if (reiserfs_file_data_log(inode)) {
		ret = _ROUND_UP(xattr_size(size), inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
		ret >>= inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
	}
	return ret;
}

/*
 * We may have to create up to 3 objects: xattr root, xattr dir, xattr file.
 * Let's try to be smart about it.
 * xattr root: We cache it. If it's not cached, we may need to create it.
 * xattr dir: If anything has been loaded for this inode, we can set a flag
 *            saying so.
 * xattr file: Since we don't cache xattrs, we can't tell. We always include
 *             blocks for it.
 *
 * However, since root and dir can be created between calls - YOU MUST SAVE
 * THIS VALUE.
 */
static inline size_t reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(struct inode *inode)
{
	size_t nblocks = JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);

	if ((REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_has_xattr_dir) == 0) {
		nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
		if (d_really_is_negative(REISERFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->xattr_root))
			nblocks += JOURNAL_BLOCKS_PER_OBJECT(inode->i_sb);
	}

	return nblocks;
}

static inline void reiserfs_init_xattr_rwsem(struct inode *inode)
{
	init_rwsem(&REISERFS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem);
}

#else

#define reiserfs_listxattr NULL

static inline void reiserfs_init_xattr_rwsem(struct inode *inode)
{
}
#endif  /*  CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR  */

#ifndef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
static inline int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir,
					 struct inode *inode,
					 const struct qstr *qstr,
					 struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
{
	return 0;
}
static inline int
reiserfs_security_write(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th,
			struct inode *inode,
			struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
{
	return 0;
}
static inline void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
{}
#endif
<select name='context' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='1'>1</option><option value='2'>2</option><option value='3' selected='selected'>3</option><option value='4'>4</option><option value='5'>5</option><option value='6'>6</option><option value='7'>7</option><option value='8'>8</option><option value='9'>9</option><option value='10'>10</option><option value='15'>15</option><option value='20'>20</option><option value='25'>25</option><option value='30'>30</option><option value='35'>35</option><option value='40'>40</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>space:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='ignorews' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>include</option><option value='1'>ignore</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>mode:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='dt' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>unified</option><option value='1'>ssdiff</option><option value='2'>stat only</option></select></td></tr><tr><td/><td class='ctrl'><noscript><input type='submit' value='reload'/></noscript></td></tr></table></form></div><table summary='commit info' class='commit-info'>
<tr><th>author</th><td>Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-01-31 23:58:38 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>committer</th><td>Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-02-01 08:37:27 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>commit</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468'>dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/patch/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468'>patch</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><th>tree</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468'>55703c2ea8584e303e342090614e0aab3509ab21</a> /<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468'>security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h</a></td></tr>
<tr><th>parent</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468&amp;id2=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>diff</a>)</td></tr></table>
<div class='commit-subject'>perf/x86/intel/rapl: Make package handling more robust</div><div class='commit-msg'>The package management code in RAPL relies on package mapping being
available before a CPU is started. This changed with:

  9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")

because the ACPI/BIOS information turned out to be unreliable, but that
left RAPL in broken state. This was not noticed because on a regular boot
all CPUs are online before RAPL is initialized.

A possible fix would be to reintroduce the mess which allocates a package
data structure in CPU prepare and when it turns out to already exist in
starting throw it away later in the CPU online callback. But that's a
horrible hack and not required at all because RAPL becomes functional for
perf only in the CPU online callback. That's correct because user space is
not yet informed about the CPU being onlined, so nothing caan rely on RAPL
being available on that particular CPU.

Move the allocation to the CPU online callback and simplify the hotplug
handling. At this point the package mapping is established and correct.

This also adds a missing check for available package data in the
event_init() function.

Reported-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;yasu.isimatu@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 9d85eb9119f4 ("x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170131230141.212593966@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</div><div class='diffstat-header'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/?id=dd86e373e09fb16b83e8adf5c48c421a4ca76468'>Diffstat</a> (limited to 'security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h')</div><table summary='diffstat' class='diffstat'>