#include "reiserfs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xattr.h" #include #include static int security_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { if (IS_PRIVATE(inode)) return -EPERM; return reiserfs_xattr_get(inode, xattr_full_name(handler, name), buffer, size); } static int security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { if (IS_PRIVATE(inode)) return -EPERM; return reiserfs_xattr_set(inode, xattr_full_name(handler, name), buffer, size, flags); } static bool security_list(struct dentry *dentry) { return !IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry)); } /* Initializes the security context for a new inode and returns the number * of blocks needed for the transaction. If successful, reiserfs_security * must be released using reiserfs_security_free when the caller is done. */ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *qstr, struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { int blocks = 0; int error; sec->name = NULL; /* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */ if (IS_PRIVATE(dir)) return 0; error = security_old_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &sec->name, &sec->value, &sec->length); if (error) { if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; sec->name = NULL; sec->value = NULL; sec->length = 0; return error; } if (sec->length && reiserfs_xattrs_initialized(inode->i_sb)) { blocks = reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(inode) + reiserfs_xattr_nblocks(inode, sec->length); /* We don't want to count the directories twice if we have * a default ACL. */ REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags |= i_has_xattr_dir; } return blocks; } int reiserfs_security_write(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th, struct inode *inode, struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { int error; if (strlen(sec->name) < sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX)) return -EINVAL; error = reiserfs_xattr_set_handle(th, inode, sec->name, sec->value, sec->length, XATTR_CREATE); if (error == -ENODATA || error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; return error; } void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { kfree(sec->name); kfree(sec->value); sec->name = NULL; sec->value = NULL; } const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_security_handler = { .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, .get = security_get, .set = security_set, .list = security_list, }; 'path'>path: root/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_sddr09.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2017-01-31 09:37:34 +0100
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2017-01-31 21:47:58 +0100
commit0becc0ae5b42828785b589f686725ff5bc3b9b25 (patch)
treebe6d0e1f37c38ed0a7dd5da2d4b1e93f0fb43101 /drivers/usb/storage/unusual_sddr09.h
parent24c2503255d35c269b67162c397a1a1c1e02f6ce (diff)
x86/mce: Make timer handling more robust
Erik reported that on a preproduction hardware a CMCI storm triggers the BUG_ON in add_timer_on(). The reason is that the per CPU MCE timer is started by the CMCI logic before the MCE CPU hotplug callback starts the timer with add_timer_on(). So the timer is already queued which triggers the BUG. Using add_timer_on() is pretty pointless in this code because the timer is strictlty per CPU, initialized as pinned and all operations which arm the timer happen on the CPU to which the timer belongs. Simplify the whole machinery by using mod_timer() instead of add_timer_on() which avoids the problem because mod_timer() can handle already queued timers. Use __start_timer() everywhere so the earliest armed expiry time is preserved. Reported-by: Erik Veijola <erik.veijola@intel.com> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701310936080.3457@nanos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/usb/storage/unusual_sddr09.h')