#include "reiserfs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xattr.h" #include #include static int security_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { if (IS_PRIVATE(inode)) return -EPERM; return reiserfs_xattr_get(inode, xattr_full_name(handler, name), buffer, size); } static int security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { if (IS_PRIVATE(inode)) return -EPERM; return reiserfs_xattr_set(inode, xattr_full_name(handler, name), buffer, size, flags); } static bool security_list(struct dentry *dentry) { return !IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry)); } /* Initializes the security context for a new inode and returns the number * of blocks needed for the transaction. If successful, reiserfs_security * must be released using reiserfs_security_free when the caller is done. */ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *qstr, struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { int blocks = 0; int error; sec->name = NULL; /* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */ if (IS_PRIVATE(dir)) return 0; error = security_old_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &sec->name, &sec->value, &sec->length); if (error) { if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; sec->name = NULL; sec->value = NULL; sec->length = 0; return error; } if (sec->length && reiserfs_xattrs_initialized(inode->i_sb)) { blocks = reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(inode) + reiserfs_xattr_nblocks(inode, sec->length); /* We don't want to count the directories twice if we have * a default ACL. */ REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags |= i_has_xattr_dir; } return blocks; } int reiserfs_security_write(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th, struct inode *inode, struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { int error; if (strlen(sec->name) < sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX)) return -EINVAL; error = reiserfs_xattr_set_handle(th, inode, sec->name, sec->value, sec->length, XATTR_CREATE); if (error == -ENODATA || error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; return error; } void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { kfree(sec->name); kfree(sec->value); sec->name = NULL; sec->value = NULL; } const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_security_handler = { .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, .get = security_get, .set = security_set, .list = security_list, }; 'search' size='10' name='q' value=''/>
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authorSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>2017-01-30 19:27:10 -0500
committerSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>2017-01-31 09:13:49 -0500
commit79c6f448c8b79c321e4a1f31f98194e4f6b6cae7 (patch)
tree370efda701f03cccf21e02bb1fdd3b852547d75c /tools/testing/selftests/rcutorture/configs/rcu/TREE01
parent0c744ea4f77d72b3dcebb7a8f2684633ec79be88 (diff)
tracing: Fix hwlat kthread migration
The hwlat tracer creates a kernel thread at start of the tracer. It is pinned to a single CPU and will move to the next CPU after each period of running. If the user modifies the migration thread's affinity, it will not change after that happens. The original code created the thread at the first instance it was called, but later was changed to destroy the thread after the tracer was finished, and would not be created until the next instance of the tracer was established. The code that initialized the affinity was only called on the initial instantiation of the tracer. After that, it was not initialized, and the previous affinity did not match the current newly created one, making it appear that the user modified the thread's affinity when it did not, and the thread failed to migrate again. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0330f7aa8ee6 ("tracing: Have hwlat trace migrate across tracing_cpumask CPUs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/rcutorture/configs/rcu/TREE01')