/* * Diffie-Hellman secret to be used with kpp API along with helper functions * * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) * any later version. * */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_DH_ #define _CRYPTO_DH_ /** * DOC: DH Helper Functions * * To use DH with the KPP cipher API, the following data structure and * functions should be used. * * To use DH with KPP, the following functions should be used to operate on * a DH private key. The packet private key that can be set with * the KPP API function call of crypto_kpp_set_secret. */ /** * struct dh - define a DH private key * * @key: Private DH key * @p: Diffie-Hellman parameter P * @g: Diffie-Hellman generator G * @key_size: Size of the private DH key * @p_size: Size of DH parameter P * @g_size: Size of DH generator G */ struct dh { void *key; void *p; void *g; unsigned int key_size; unsigned int p_size; unsigned int g_size; }; /** * crypto_dh_key_len() - Obtain the size of the private DH key * @params: private DH key * * This function returns the packet DH key size. A caller can use that * with the provided DH private key reference to obtain the required * memory size to hold a packet key. * * Return: size of the key in bytes */ int crypto_dh_key_len(const struct dh *params); /** * crypto_dh_encode_key() - encode the private key * @buf: Buffer allocated by the caller to hold the packet DH * private key. The buffer should be at least crypto_dh_key_len * bytes in size. * @len: Length of the packet private key buffer * @params: Buffer with the caller-specified private key * * The DH implementations operate on a packet representation of the private * key. * * Return: -EINVAL if buffer has insufficient size, 0 on success */ int crypto_dh_encode_key(char *buf, unsigned int len, const struct dh *params); /** * crypto_dh_decode_key() - decode a private key * @buf: Buffer holding a packet key that should be decoded * @len: Lenth of the packet private key buffer * @params: Buffer allocated by the caller that is filled with the * unpacket DH private key. * * The unpacking obtains the private key by pointing @p to the correct location * in @buf. Thus, both pointers refer to the same memory. * * Return: -EINVAL if buffer has insufficient size, 0 on success */ int crypto_dh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len, struct dh *params); #endif ion>
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authorArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>2017-02-01 17:45:02 +0000
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-02-01 21:17:49 +0100
commitc8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92 (patch)
treed53fbdac9d0781e39a13b2ac6b2bd258cf3b4140 /net/dccp/Makefile
parentbf29bddf0417a4783da3b24e8c9e017ac649326f (diff)
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(), after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported. Commit: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices(). Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses, manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults. So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better place for it anyway) Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code (i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally safe. Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dccp/Makefile')