#ifndef __sctp_tsnmap_h__
#define __sctp_tsnmap_h__
/* RFC 2960 12.2 Parameters necessary per association (i.e. the TCB)
* Mapping An array of bits or bytes indicating which out of
* Array order TSN's have been received (relative to the
* Last Rcvd TSN). If no gaps exist, i.e. no out of
* order packets have been received, this array
* will be set to all zero. This structure may be
* in the form of a circular buffer or bit array.
*/
struct sctp_tsnmap {
/* This array counts the number of chunks with each TSN.
* It points at one of the two buffers with which we will
* ping-pong between.
*/
unsigned long *tsn_map;
/* This is the TSN at tsn_map[0]. */
__u32 base_tsn;
/* Last Rcvd : This is the last TSN received in
* TSN : sequence. This value is set initially by
* : taking the peer's Initial TSN, received in
* : the INIT or INIT ACK chunk, and subtracting
* : one from it.
*
* Throughout most of the specification this is called the
* "Cumulative TSN ACK Point". In this case, we
* ignore the advice in 12.2 in favour of the term
* used in the bulk of the text.
*/
__u32 cumulative_tsn_ack_point;
/* This is the highest TSN we've marked. */
__u32 max_tsn_seen;
/* This is the minimum number of TSNs we can track. This corresponds
* to the size of tsn_map. Note: the overflow_map allows us to
* potentially track more than this quantity.
*/
__u16 len;
/* Data chunks pending receipt. used by SCTP_STATUS sockopt */
__u16 pending_data;
/* Record duplicate TSNs here. We clear this after
* every SACK. Store up to SCTP_MAX_DUP_TSNS worth of
* information.
*/
__u16 num_dup_tsns;
__be32 dup_tsns[SCTP_MAX_DUP_TSNS];
};
struct sctp_tsnmap_iter {
__u32 start;
};
/* Initialize a block of memory as a tsnmap. */
struct sctp_tsnmap *sctp_tsnmap_init(struct sctp_tsnmap *, __u16 len,
__u32 initial_tsn, gfp_t gfp);
void sctp_tsnmap_free(struct sctp_tsnmap *map);
/* Test the tracking state of this TSN.
* Returns:
* 0 if the TSN has not yet been seen
* >0 if the TSN has been seen (duplicate)
* <0 if the TSN is invalid (too large to track)
*/
int sctp_tsnmap_check(const struct sctp_tsnmap *, __u32 tsn);
/* Mark this TSN as seen. */
int sctp_tsnmap_mark(struct sctp_tsnmap *, __u32 tsn,
struct sctp_transport *trans);
/* Mark this TSN and all lower as seen. */
void sctp_tsnmap_skip(struct sctp_tsnmap *map, __u32 tsn);
/* Retrieve the Cumulative TSN ACK Point. */
static inline __u32 sctp_tsnmap_get_ctsn(const struct sctp_tsnmap *map)
{
return map->cumulative_tsn_ack_point;
}
/* Retrieve the highest TSN we've seen. */
static inline __u32 sctp_tsnmap_get_max_tsn_seen(const struct sctp_tsnmap *map)
{
return map->max_tsn_seen;
}
/* How many duplicate TSNs are stored? */
static inline __u16 sctp_tsnmap_num_dups(struct sctp_tsnmap *map)
{
return map->num_dup_tsns;
}
/* Return pointer to duplicate tsn array as needed by SACK. */
static inline __be32 *sctp_tsnmap_get_dups(struct sctp_tsnmap *map)
{
map->num_dup_tsns = 0;
return map->dup_tsns;
}
/* How many gap ack blocks do we have recorded? */
__u16 sctp_tsnmap_num_gabs(struct sctp_tsnmap *map,
struct sctp_gap_ack_block *gabs);
/* Refresh the count on pending data. */
__u16 sctp_tsnmap_pending(struct sctp_tsnmap *map);
/* Is there a gap in the TSN map? */
static inline int sctp_tsnmap_has_gap(const struct sctp_tsnmap *map)
{
return map->cumulative_tsn_ack_point != map->max_tsn_seen;
}
/* Mark a duplicate TSN. Note: limit the storage of duplicate TSN
* information.
*/
static inline void sctp_tsnmap_mark_dup(struct sctp_tsnmap *map, __u32 tsn)
{
if (map->num_dup_tsns < SCTP_MAX_DUP_TSNS)
map->dup_tsns[map->num_dup_tsns++] = htonl(tsn);
}
/* Renege a TSN that was seen. */
void sctp_tsnmap_renege(struct sctp_tsnmap *, __u32 tsn);
/* Is there a gap in the TSN map? */
int sctp_tsnmap_has_gap(const struct sctp_tsnmap *);
#endif /* __sctp_tsnmap_h__ */
3'>patch)
| tree | b57055b47f24bf61bab71eed776f258974d6b6f4 /net/mac80211/Kconfig |
|---|
| parent | b699b71d82e77203be43bda5ff1b72516f129581 (diff) |
|---|
mac80211: fils_aead: Use crypto api CMAC shash rather than bare cipher
Switch the FILS AEAD code to use a cmac(aes) shash instantiated by the
crypto API rather than reusing the open coded implementation in
aes_cmac_vector(). This makes the code more understandable, and allows
platforms to implement cmac(aes) in a more secure (*) and efficient way
than is typically possible when using the AES cipher directly.
So replace the crypto_cipher by a crypto_shash, and update the aes_s2v()
routine to call the shash interface directly.
* In particular, the generic table based AES implementation is sensitive
to known-plaintext timing attacks on the key, to which AES based MAC
algorithms are especially vulnerable, given that their plaintext is not
usually secret. Time invariant alternatives are available (e.g., based
on SIMD algorithms), but may incur a setup cost that is prohibitive when
operating on a single block at a time, which is why they don't usually
expose the cipher API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/Kconfig b/net/mac80211/Kconfig |