/*
 *	Definitions for the UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) code.
 */
#ifndef _UDPLITE_H
#define _UDPLITE_H

#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>

/* UDP-Lite socket options */
#define UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV   10 /* sender partial coverage (as sent)      */
#define UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV   11 /* receiver partial coverage (threshold ) */

extern struct proto 		udplite_prot;
extern struct udp_table		udplite_table;

/*
 *	Checksum computation is all in software, hence simpler getfrag.
 */
static __inline__ int udplite_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int  offset,
				      int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct msghdr *msg = from;
	return copy_from_iter_full(to, len, &msg->msg_iter) ? 0 : -EFAULT;
}

/* Designate sk as UDP-Lite socket */
static inline int udplite_sk_init(struct sock *sk)
{
	udp_sk(sk)->pcflag = UDPLITE_BIT;
	sk->sk_destruct = udp_destruct_sock;
	return 0;
}

/*
 * 	Checksumming routines
 */
static inline int udplite_checksum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udphdr *uh)
{
	u16 cscov;

        /* In UDPv4 a zero checksum means that the transmitter generated no
         * checksum. UDP-Lite (like IPv6) mandates checksums, hence packets
         * with a zero checksum field are illegal.                            */
	if (uh->check == 0) {
		net_dbg_ratelimited("UDPLite: zeroed checksum field\n");
		return 1;
	}

	cscov = ntohs(uh->len);

	if (cscov == 0)		 /* Indicates that full coverage is required. */
		;
	else if (cscov < 8  || cscov > skb->len) {
		/*
		 * Coverage length violates RFC 3828: log and discard silently.
		 */
		net_dbg_ratelimited("UDPLite: bad csum coverage %d/%d\n",
				    cscov, skb->len);
		return 1;

	} else if (cscov < skb->len) {
        	UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov = 1;
		UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov = cscov;
		if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
			skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
        }

	return 0;
}

/* Slow-path computation of checksum. Socket is locked. */
static inline __wsum udplite_csum_outgoing(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	const struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(skb->sk);
	int cscov = up->len;
	__wsum csum = 0;

	if (up->pcflag & UDPLITE_SEND_CC) {
		/*
		 * Sender has set `partial coverage' option on UDP-Lite socket.
		 * The special case "up->pcslen == 0" signifies full coverage.
		 */
		if (up->pcslen < up->len) {
			if (0 < up->pcslen)
				cscov = up->pcslen;
			udp_hdr(skb)->len = htons(up->pcslen);
		}
		/*
		 * NOTE: Causes for the error case  `up->pcslen > up->len':
		 *        (i)  Application error (will not be penalized).
		 *       (ii)  Payload too big for send buffer: data is split
		 *             into several packets, each with its own header.
		 *             In this case (e.g. last segment), coverage may
		 *             exceed packet length.
		 *       Since packets with coverage length > packet length are
		 *       illegal, we fall back to the defaults here.
		 */
	}

	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;     /* no HW support for checksumming */

	skb_queue_walk(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb) {
		const int off = skb_transport_offset(skb);
		const int len = skb->len - off;

		csum = skb_checksum(skb, off, (cscov > len)? len : cscov, csum);

		if ((cscov -= len) <= 0)
			break;
	}
	return csum;
}

/* Fast-path computation of checksum. Socket may not be locked. */
static inline __wsum udplite_csum(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	const struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(skb->sk);
	const int off = skb_transport_offset(skb);
	int len = skb->len - off;

	if ((up->pcflag & UDPLITE_SEND_CC) && up->pcslen < len) {
		if (0 < up->pcslen)
			len = up->pcslen;
		udp_hdr(skb)->len = htons(up->pcslen);
	}
	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;     /* no HW support for checksumming */

	return skb_checksum(skb, off, len, 0);
}

void udplite4_register(void);
int udplite_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
		     int (*scmp)(const struct sock *, const struct sock *));
#endif	/* _UDPLITE_H */
on><option value='20'>20</option><option value='25'>25</option><option value='30'>30</option><option value='35'>35</option><option value='40'>40</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>space:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='ignorews' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>include</option><option value='1'>ignore</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>mode:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='dt' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>unified</option><option value='1'>ssdiff</option><option value='2'>stat only</option></select></td></tr><tr><td/><td class='ctrl'><noscript><input type='submit' value='reload'/></noscript></td></tr></table></form></div><table summary='commit info' class='commit-info'>
<tr><th>author</th><td>Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-01-26 23:15:08 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>committer</th><td>Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-01-30 11:41:26 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>commit</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/net/ceph/crush/hash.c?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/patch/net/ceph/crush/hash.c?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>patch</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><th>tree</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>85d0d9b3ac902af2c938b19a566884caf8d00323</a> /<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/net/ceph/crush/hash.c?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>net/ceph/crush/hash.c</a></td></tr>
<tr><th>parent</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/net/ceph/crush/hash.c?id=a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588'>a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/net/ceph/crush/hash.c?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba&amp;id2=a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588'>diff</a>)</td></tr></table>
<div class='commit-subject'>perf/core: Fix PERF_RECORD_MMAP2 prot/flags for anonymous memory</div><div class='commit-msg'>Andres reported that MMAP2 records for anonymous memory always have
their protection field 0.

Turns out, someone daft put the prot/flags generation code in the file
branch, leaving them unset for anonymous memory.

Reported-by: Andres Freund &lt;andres@anarazel.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: anton@ozlabs.org
Cc: namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Fixes: f972eb63b100 ("perf: Pass protection and flags bits through mmap2 interface")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170126221508.GF6536@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</div><div class='diffstat-header'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>Diffstat</a> (limited to 'net/ceph/crush/hash.c')</div><table summary='diffstat' class='diffstat'>