/****************************************************************************** * features.h * * Feature flags, reported by XENVER_get_features. * * Copyright (c) 2006, Keir Fraser */ #ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ #define __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ /* * If set, the guest does not need to write-protect its pagetables, and can * update them via direct writes. */ #define XENFEAT_writable_page_tables 0 /* * If set, the guest does not need to write-protect its segment descriptor * tables, and can update them via direct writes. */ #define XENFEAT_writable_descriptor_tables 1 /* * If set, translation between the guest's 'pseudo-physical' address space * and the host's machine address space are handled by the hypervisor. In this * mode the guest does not need to perform phys-to/from-machine translations * when performing page table operations. */ #define XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap 2 /* If set, the guest is running in supervisor mode (e.g., x86 ring 0). */ #define XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel 3 /* * If set, the guest does not need to allocate x86 PAE page directories * below 4GB. This flag is usually implied by auto_translated_physmap. */ #define XENFEAT_pae_pgdir_above_4gb 4 /* x86: Does this Xen host support the MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD hypercall? */ #define XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad 5 /* * If set, GNTTABOP_map_grant_ref honors flags to be placed into guest kernel * available pte bits. */ #define XENFEAT_gnttab_map_avail_bits 7 /* x86: Does this Xen host support the HVM callback vector type? */ #define XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector 8 /* x86: pvclock algorithm is safe to use on HVM */ #define XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock 9 /* x86: pirq can be used by HVM guests */ #define XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs 10 /* operation as Dom0 is supported */ #define XENFEAT_dom0 11 #define XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS 1 #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ */ 15c25e92'>treecommitdiff
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authorArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>2017-02-01 17:45:02 +0000
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-02-01 21:17:49 +0100
commitc8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92 (patch)
treed53fbdac9d0781e39a13b2ac6b2bd258cf3b4140 /net/mac80211/michael.c
parentbf29bddf0417a4783da3b24e8c9e017ac649326f (diff)
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(), after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported. Commit: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices(). Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses, manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults. So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better place for it anyway) Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code (i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally safe. Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/michael.c')