/*
* Details of the "wire" protocol between Xen Store Daemon and client
* library or guest kernel.
* Copyright (C) 2005 Rusty Russell IBM Corporation
*/
#ifndef _XS_WIRE_H
#define _XS_WIRE_H
enum xsd_sockmsg_type
{
XS_DEBUG,
XS_DIRECTORY,
XS_READ,
XS_GET_PERMS,
XS_WATCH,
XS_UNWATCH,
XS_TRANSACTION_START,
XS_TRANSACTION_END,
XS_INTRODUCE,
XS_RELEASE,
XS_GET_DOMAIN_PATH,
XS_WRITE,
XS_MKDIR,
XS_RM,
XS_SET_PERMS,
XS_WATCH_EVENT,
XS_ERROR,
XS_IS_DOMAIN_INTRODUCED,
XS_RESUME,
XS_SET_TARGET,
XS_RESTRICT,
XS_RESET_WATCHES,
};
#define XS_WRITE_NONE "NONE"
#define XS_WRITE_CREATE "CREATE"
#define XS_WRITE_CREATE_EXCL "CREATE|EXCL"
/* We hand errors as strings, for portability. */
struct xsd_errors
{
int errnum;
const char *errstring;
};
#define XSD_ERROR(x) { x, #x }
static struct xsd_errors xsd_errors[] __attribute__((unused)) = {
XSD_ERROR(EINVAL),
XSD_ERROR(EACCES),
XSD_ERROR(EEXIST),
XSD_ERROR(EISDIR),
XSD_ERROR(ENOENT),
XSD_ERROR(ENOMEM),
XSD_ERROR(ENOSPC),
XSD_ERROR(EIO),
XSD_ERROR(ENOTEMPTY),
XSD_ERROR(ENOSYS),
XSD_ERROR(EROFS),
XSD_ERROR(EBUSY),
XSD_ERROR(EAGAIN),
XSD_ERROR(EISCONN)
};
struct xsd_sockmsg
{
uint32_t type; /* XS_??? */
uint32_t req_id;/* Request identifier, echoed in daemon's response. */
uint32_t tx_id; /* Transaction id (0 if not related to a transaction). */
uint32_t len; /* Length of data following this. */
/* Generally followed by nul-terminated string(s). */
};
enum xs_watch_type
{
XS_WATCH_PATH = 0,
XS_WATCH_TOKEN
};
/* Inter-domain shared memory communications. */
#define XENSTORE_RING_SIZE 1024
typedef uint32_t XENSTORE_RING_IDX;
#define MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(idx) ((idx) & (XENSTORE_RING_SIZE-1))
struct xenstore_domain_interface {
char req[XENSTORE_RING_SIZE]; /* Requests to xenstore daemon. */
char rsp[XENSTORE_RING_SIZE]; /* Replies and async watch events. */
XENSTORE_RING_IDX req_cons, req_prod;
XENSTORE_RING_IDX rsp_cons, rsp_prod;
};
/* Violating this is very bad. See docs/misc/xenstore.txt. */
#define XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX 4096
#endif /* _XS_WIRE_H */
ls/thermal/tmon/pid.c?h=nds-private-remove&id=c8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92'>diff
|
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(),
after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported.
Commit:
abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel")
fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but
inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some
of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices().
Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated
string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses,
manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults.
So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the
callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it
calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better
place for it anyway)
Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with
the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from
cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code
(i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally
safe.
Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>