/* mpihelp-mul_1.c - MPI helper functions
* Copyright (C) 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*
* Note: This code is heavily based on the GNU MP Library.
* Actually it's the same code with only minor changes in the
* way the data is stored; this is to support the abstraction
* of an optional secure memory allocation which may be used
* to avoid revealing of sensitive data due to paging etc.
* The GNU MP Library itself is published under the LGPL;
* however I decided to publish this code under the plain GPL.
*/
#include "mpi-internal.h"
#include "longlong.h"
mpi_limb_t
mpihelp_mul_1(mpi_ptr_t res_ptr, mpi_ptr_t s1_ptr, mpi_size_t s1_size,
mpi_limb_t s2_limb)
{
mpi_limb_t cy_limb;
mpi_size_t j;
mpi_limb_t prod_high, prod_low;
/* The loop counter and index J goes from -S1_SIZE to -1. This way
* the loop becomes faster. */
j = -s1_size;
/* Offset the base pointers to compensate for the negative indices. */
s1_ptr -= j;
res_ptr -= j;
cy_limb = 0;
do {
umul_ppmm(prod_high, prod_low, s1_ptr[j], s2_limb);
prod_low += cy_limb;
cy_limb = (prod_low < cy_limb ? 1 : 0) + prod_high;
res_ptr[j] = prod_low;
} while (++j);
return cy_limb;
}
/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/net/mac80211?id=d6e0edf1ff6b97425d9548f27385ac7b4921f5a0'>diff
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Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next
Johannes Berg says:
====================
Some more updates:
* use shash in mac80211 crypto code where applicable
* some documentation fixes
* pass RSSI levels up in change notifications
* remove unused rfkill-regulator
* various other cleanups
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add the missing IBSS capability flag during capability init as it needs
to be inserted into the generated beacon in order for CSA to work.
Fixes: cd7760e62c2ac ("mac80211: add support for CSA in IBSS mode")
Signed-off-by: Piotr Gawlowicz <gawlowicz@tkn.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Mikołaj Chwalisz <chwalisz@tkn.tu-berlin.de>
Tested-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The nl80211_nan_dual_band_conf enumeration doesn't make much sense.
The default value is assigned to a bit, which makes it weird if the
default bit and other bits are set at the same time.
To improve this, get rid of NL80211_NAN_BAND_DEFAULT and add a wiphy
configuration to let the drivers define which bands are supported.
This is exposed to the userspace, which then can make a decision on
which band(s) to use. Additionally, rename all "dual_band" elements
to "bands", to make things clearer.
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Update the drivers to pass the RSSI level as a cfg80211_cqm_rssi_notify
parameter and pass this value to userspace in a new nl80211 attribute.
This helps both userspace and also helps in the implementation of the
multiple RSSI thresholds CQM mechanism.
Note for marvell/mwifiex I pass 0 for the RSSI value because the new
RSSI value is not available to the driver at the time of the
cfg80211_cqm_rssi_notify call, but the driver queries the new value
immediately after that, so it is actually available just a moment later
if we wanted to defer caling cfg80211_cqm_rssi_notify until that moment.
Without this, the new cfg80211 code (patch 3) will call .get_station
which will send a duplicate HostCmd_CMD_RSSI_INFO command to the hardware.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Extend ieee80211_cqm_rssi_notify with a rssi_level parameter so that
this information can be passed to netlink clients in the next patch, if
available. Most drivers will have this value at hand. wl1251 receives
events from the firmware that only tell it whether latest measurement
is above or below threshold so we don't pass any value at this time
(parameter is 0).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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kmalloc() can fail. Also let's move the allocation out of the
declaration block so it's easier to read.
Fixes: 4a5eccaa9350 ("mac80211: Show pending txqlen in debugfs.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Instead of open coding the CMAC algorithm in the mac80211 driver using
byte wide xors and calls into the crypto layer for each block of data,
instantiate a cmac(aes) synchronous hash and pass all the data into it
directly. This does not only simplify the code, it also allows the use
of more efficient and more secure implementations, especially on
platforms where SIMD ciphers have a considerable setup cost.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Switch the FILS AEAD code to use a cmac(aes) shash instantiated by the
crypto API rather than reusing the open coded implementation in
aes_cmac_vector(). This makes the code more understandable, and allows
platforms to implement cmac(aes) in a more secure (*) and efficient way
than is typically possible when using the AES cipher directly.
So replace the crypto_cipher by a crypto_shash, and update the aes_s2v()
routine to call the shash interface directly.
* In particular, the generic table based AES implementation is sensitive
to known-plaintext timing attacks on the key, to which AES based MAC
algorithms are especially vulnerable, given that their plaintext is not
usually secret. Time invariant alternatives are available (e.g., based
on SIMD algorithms), but may incur a setup cost that is prohibitive when
operating on a single block at a time, which is why they don't usually
expose the cipher API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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