/*
 * INET		An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
 *		operating system.  INET is implemented using the  BSD Socket
 *		interface as the means of communication with the user level.
 *
 *		The IP forwarding functionality.
 *
 * Authors:	see ip.c
 *
 * Fixes:
 *		Many		:	Split from ip.c , see ip_input.c for
 *					history.
 *		Dave Gregorich	:	NULL ip_rt_put fix for multicast
 *					routing.
 *		Jos Vos		:	Add call_out_firewall before sending,
 *					use output device for accounting.
 *		Jos Vos		:	Call forward firewall after routing
 *					(always use output device).
 *		Mike McLagan	:	Routing by source
 */

#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/icmp.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <net/checksum.h>
#include <linux/route.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>

static bool ip_exceeds_mtu(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int mtu)
{
	if (skb->len <= mtu)
		return false;

	if (unlikely((ip_hdr(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) == 0))
		return false;

	/* original fragment exceeds mtu and DF is set */
	if (unlikely(IPCB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu))
		return true;

	if (skb->ignore_df)
		return false;

	if (skb_is_gso(skb) && skb_gso_validate_mtu(skb, mtu))
		return false;

	return true;
}


static int ip_forward_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct ip_options *opt	= &(IPCB(skb)->opt);

	__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
	__IP_ADD_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);

	if (unlikely(opt->optlen))
		ip_forward_options(skb);

	return dst_output(net, sk, skb);
}

int ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	u32 mtu;
	struct iphdr *iph;	/* Our header */
	struct rtable *rt;	/* Route we use */
	struct ip_options *opt	= &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
	struct net *net;

	/* that should never happen */
	if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
		goto drop;

	if (unlikely(skb->sk))
		goto drop;

	if (skb_warn_if_lro(skb))
		goto drop;

	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_FWD, skb))
		goto drop;

	if (IPCB(skb)->opt.router_alert && ip_call_ra_chain(skb))
		return NET_RX_SUCCESS;

	skb_forward_csum(skb);
	net = dev_net(skb->dev);

	/*
	 *	According to the RFC, we must first decrease the TTL field. If
	 *	that reaches zero, we must reply an ICMP control message telling
	 *	that the packet's lifetime expired.
	 */
	if (ip_hdr(skb)->ttl <= 1)
		goto too_many_hops;

	if (!xfrm4_route_forward(skb))
		goto drop;

	rt = skb_rtable(skb);

	if (opt->is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
		goto sr_failed;

	IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_FORWARDED;
	mtu = ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(&rt->dst, true);
	if (ip_exceeds_mtu(skb, mtu)) {
		IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
		icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
			  htonl(mtu));
		goto drop;
	}

	/* We are about to mangle packet. Copy it! */
	if (skb_cow(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev)+rt->dst.header_len))
		goto drop;
	iph = ip_hdr(skb);

	/* Decrease ttl after skb cow done */
	ip_decrease_ttl(iph);

	/*
	 *	We now generate an ICMP HOST REDIRECT giving the route
	 *	we calculated.
	 */
	if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_DOREDIRECT && !opt->srr &&
	    !skb_sec_path(skb))
		ip_rt_send_redirect(skb);

	skb->priority = rt_tos2priority(iph->tos);

	return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_FORWARD,
		       net, NULL, skb, skb->dev, rt->dst.dev,
		       ip_forward_finish);

sr_failed:
	/*
	 *	Strict routing permits no gatewaying
	 */
	 icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_SR_FAILED, 0);
	 goto drop;

too_many_hops:
	/* Tell the sender its packet died... */
	__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
	icmp_send(skb, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_TTL, 0);
drop:
	kfree_skb(skb);
	return NET_RX_DROP;
}
<select name='ignorews' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>include</option><option value='1'>ignore</option></select></td></tr><tr><td class='label'>mode:</td><td class='ctrl'><select name='dt' onchange='this.form.submit();'><option value='0' selected='selected'>unified</option><option value='1'>ssdiff</option><option value='2'>stat only</option></select></td></tr><tr><td/><td class='ctrl'><noscript><input type='submit' value='reload'/></noscript></td></tr></table></form></div><table summary='commit info' class='commit-info'>
<tr><th>author</th><td>Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-01-26 23:15:08 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>committer</th><td>Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;</td><td class='right'>2017-01-30 11:41:26 +0100</td></tr>
<tr><th>commit</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/net/decnet/README?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/patch/net/decnet/README?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>patch</a>)</td></tr>
<tr><th>tree</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>85d0d9b3ac902af2c938b19a566884caf8d00323</a> /<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/tree/net/decnet/README?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>net/decnet/README</a></td></tr>
<tr><th>parent</th><td colspan='2' class='oid'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/net/decnet/README?id=a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588'>a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588</a> (<a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/net/decnet/README?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba&amp;id2=a76a82a3e38c8d3fb6499e3dfaeb0949241ab588'>diff</a>)</td></tr></table>
<div class='commit-subject'>perf/core: Fix PERF_RECORD_MMAP2 prot/flags for anonymous memory</div><div class='commit-msg'>Andres reported that MMAP2 records for anonymous memory always have
their protection field 0.

Turns out, someone daft put the prot/flags generation code in the file
branch, leaving them unset for anonymous memory.

Reported-by: Andres Freund &lt;andres@anarazel.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: anton@ozlabs.org
Cc: namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Fixes: f972eb63b100 ("perf: Pass protection and flags bits through mmap2 interface")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170126221508.GF6536@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</div><div class='diffstat-header'><a href='/cgit.cgi/linux/net-next.git/diff/?id=0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba'>Diffstat</a> (limited to 'net/decnet/README')</div><table summary='diffstat' class='diffstat'>