/* * AES-GMAC for IEEE 802.11 BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 * Copyright 2015, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as * published by the Free Software Foundation. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "key.h" #include "aes_gmac.h" int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) { struct scatterlist sg[4]; u8 *zero, *__aad, iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; struct aead_request *aead_req; int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); if (data_len < GMAC_MIC_LEN) return -EINVAL; aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GMAC_MIC_LEN + GMAC_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!aead_req) return -ENOMEM; zero = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; __aad = zero + GMAC_MIC_LEN; memcpy(__aad, aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 4); sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len - GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], zero, GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[3], mic, GMAC_MIC_LEN); memcpy(iv, nonce, GMAC_NONCE_LEN); memset(iv + GMAC_NONCE_LEN, 0, sizeof(iv) - GMAC_NONCE_LEN); iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm); aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, 0, iv); aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len); crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); kzfree(aead_req); return 0; } struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len) { struct crypto_aead *tfm; int err; tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return tfm; err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); if (!err) err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, GMAC_MIC_LEN); if (!err) return tfm; crypto_free_aead(tfm); return ERR_PTR(err); } void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm) { crypto_free_aead(tfm); } /acpi/acoutput.h?h=nds-private-remove&id=08d85f3ea99f1eeafc4e8507936190e86a16ee8c'>commitdiff
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authorMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>2017-01-17 16:00:48 +0000
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2017-01-30 15:18:56 +0100
commit08d85f3ea99f1eeafc4e8507936190e86a16ee8c (patch)
tree410bb1acd0cd7dcfaad37ae7b63ff243b7fa4bee /include/acpi/acoutput.h
parent566cf877a1fcb6d6dc0126b076aad062054c2637 (diff)
irqdomain: Avoid activating interrupts more than once
Since commit f3b0946d629c ("genirq/msi: Make sure PCI MSIs are activated early"), we can end-up activating a PCI/MSI twice (once at allocation time, and once at startup time). This is normally of no consequences, except that there is some HW out there that may misbehave if activate is used more than once (the GICv3 ITS, for example, uses the activate callback to issue the MAPVI command, and the architecture spec says that "If there is an existing mapping for the EventID-DeviceID combination, behavior is UNPREDICTABLE"). While this could be worked around in each individual driver, it may make more sense to tackle the issue at the core level. In order to avoid getting in that situation, let's have a per-interrupt flag to remember if we have already activated that interrupt or not. Fixes: f3b0946d629c ("genirq/msi: Make sure PCI MSIs are activated early") Reported-and-tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484668848-24361-1-git-send-email-marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/acpi/acoutput.h')