/* * AES-GMAC for IEEE 802.11 BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 * Copyright 2015, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as * published by the Free Software Foundation. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "key.h" #include "aes_gmac.h" int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) { struct scatterlist sg[4]; u8 *zero, *__aad, iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; struct aead_request *aead_req; int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); if (data_len < GMAC_MIC_LEN) return -EINVAL; aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GMAC_MIC_LEN + GMAC_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!aead_req) return -ENOMEM; zero = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; __aad = zero + GMAC_MIC_LEN; memcpy(__aad, aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 4); sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len - GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], zero, GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[3], mic, GMAC_MIC_LEN); memcpy(iv, nonce, GMAC_NONCE_LEN); memset(iv + GMAC_NONCE_LEN, 0, sizeof(iv) - GMAC_NONCE_LEN); iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm); aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, 0, iv); aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len); crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); kzfree(aead_req); return 0; } struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len) { struct crypto_aead *tfm; int err; tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return tfm; err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); if (!err) err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, GMAC_MIC_LEN); if (!err) return tfm; crypto_free_aead(tfm); return ERR_PTR(err); } void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm) { crypto_free_aead(tfm); } /subcmd?h=nds-private-remove&id=d7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b'>commitdiff
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authorBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>2017-02-03 17:10:28 +1100
committerMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>2017-02-08 23:36:29 +1100
commitd7df2443cd5f67fc6ee7c05a88e4996e8177f91b (patch)
tree098a7c0ca4fceb8a65cb1f693c9d71990388933d /tools/lib/subcmd
parenta0615a16f7d0ceb5804d295203c302d496d8ee91 (diff)
powerpc/mm: Fix spurrious segfaults on radix with autonuma
When autonuma (Automatic NUMA balancing) marks a PTE inaccessible it clears all the protection bits but leave the PTE valid. With the Radix MMU, an attempt at executing from such a PTE will take a fault with bit 35 of SRR1 set "SRR1_ISI_N_OR_G". It is thus incorrect to treat all such faults as errors. We should pass them to handle_mm_fault() for autonuma to deal with. The case of pages that are really not executable is handled by the existing test for VM_EXEC further down. That leaves us with catching the kernel attempts at executing user pages. We can catch that earlier, even before we do find_vma. It is never valid on powerpc for the kernel to take an exec fault to begin with. So fold that test with the existing test for the kernel faulting on kernel addresses to bail out early. Fixes: 1d18ad026844 ("powerpc/mm: Detect instruction fetch denied and report") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/subcmd')