/* * Seccomp filter example for x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) with BPF macros * * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors * Author: Will Drewry * * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose, * and can serve as a starting point for developing * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...). */ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) #define SUPPORTED_ARCH 1 #endif #if defined(SUPPORTED_ARCH) #define __USE_GNU 1 #define _GNU_SOURCE 1 #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n])) #define syscall_nr (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) #if defined(__i386__) #define REG_RESULT REG_EAX #define REG_SYSCALL REG_EAX #define REG_ARG0 REG_EBX #define REG_ARG1 REG_ECX #define REG_ARG2 REG_EDX #define REG_ARG3 REG_ESI #define REG_ARG4 REG_EDI #define REG_ARG5 REG_EBP #elif defined(__x86_64__) #define REG_RESULT REG_RAX #define REG_SYSCALL REG_RAX #define REG_ARG0 REG_RDI #define REG_ARG1 REG_RSI #define REG_ARG2 REG_RDX #define REG_ARG3 REG_R10 #define REG_ARG4 REG_R8 #define REG_ARG5 REG_R9 #endif #ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 #endif #ifndef SYS_SECCOMP #define SYS_SECCOMP 1 #endif static void emulator(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)(void_context); int syscall; char *buf; ssize_t bytes; size_t len; if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP) return; if (!ctx) return; syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL]; buf = (char *) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG1]; len = (size_t) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG2]; if (syscall != __NR_write) return; if (ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ARG0] != STDERR_FILENO) return; /* Redirect stderr messages to stdout. Doesn't handle EINTR, etc */ ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RESULT] = -1; if (write(STDOUT_FILENO, "[ERR] ", 6) > 0) { bytes = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, len); ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RESULT] = bytes; } return; } static int install_emulator(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &emulator; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) { perror("sigaction"); return -1; } if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) { perror("sigprocmask"); return -1; } return 0; } static int install_filter(void) { struct sock_filter filter[] = { /* Grab the system call number */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_nr), /* Jump table for the allowed syscalls */ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 0, 1), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), #ifdef __NR_sigreturn BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 0, 1), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), #endif BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit_group, 0, 1), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit, 0, 1), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_read, 1, 0), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_write, 3, 2), /* Check that read is only using stdin. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDIN_FILENO, 4, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL), /* Check that write is only using stdout */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDOUT_FILENO, 1, 0), /* Trap attempts to write to stderr */ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDERR_FILENO, 1, 2), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL), }; struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])), .filter = filter, }; if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)"); return 1; } if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) { perror("prctl"); return 1; } return 0; } #define payload(_c) (_c), sizeof((_c)) int main(int argc, char **argv) { char buf[4096]; ssize_t bytes = 0; if (install_emulator()) return 1; if (install_filter()) return 1; syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("OHAI! WHAT IS YOUR NAME? ")); bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)); syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("HELLO, ")); syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, bytes); syscall(__NR_write, STDERR_FILENO, payload("Error message going to STDERR\n")); return 0; } #else /* SUPPORTED_ARCH */ /* * This sample is x86-only. Since kernel samples are compiled with the * host toolchain, a non-x86 host will result in using only the main() * below. */ int main(void) { return 1; } #endif /* SUPPORTED_ARCH */ /td>2017-01-31 13:41:46 +0100 commit92c715fca907686f5298220ece53423e38ba3aed (patch) tree286158fdad04c9b54955350abb95d4f1c0dc860a /include/net/tc_act/tc_tunnel_key.h parente6e7b48b295afa5a5ab440de0a94d9ad8b3ce2d0 (diff)
drm/atomic: Fix double free in drm_atomic_state_default_clear
drm_atomic_helper_page_flip and drm_atomic_ioctl set their own events in crtc_state->event. But when it's set the event is freed in 2 places. Solve this by only freeing the event in the atomic ioctl when it allocated its own event. This has been broken twice. The first time when the code was introduced, but only in the corner case when an event is allocated, but more crtc's were included by atomic check and then failing. This can mostly happen when you do an atomic modeset in i915 and the display clock is changed, which forces all crtc's to be included to the state. This has been broken worse by adding in-fences support, which caused the double free to be done unconditionally. [IGT] kms_rotation_crc: starting subtest primary-rotation-180 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G U ): Object already free ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x285/0x2f0 [drm_kms_helper] age=0 cpu=3 pid=1529 ___slab_alloc+0x308/0x3b0 __slab_alloc+0xd/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x92/0x1c0 drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x285/0x2f0 [drm_kms_helper] intel_atomic_commit+0x35/0x4f0 [i915] drm_atomic_commit+0x46/0x50 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x7d4/0xab0 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2b3/0x490 [drm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x69c/0x700 SyS_ioctl+0x4e/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 INFO: Freed in drm_event_cancel_free+0xa3/0xb0 [drm] age=0 cpu=3 pid=1529 __slab_free+0x48/0x2e0 kfree+0x159/0x1a0 drm_event_cancel_free+0xa3/0xb0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x86d/0xab0 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2b3/0x490 [drm] do_vfs_ioctl+0x69c/0x700 SyS_ioctl+0x4e/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 INFO: Slab 0xffffde1f0997b080 objects=17 used=2 fp=0xffff92fb65ec2578 flags=0x200000000008101 INFO: Object 0xffff92fb65ec2578 @offset=1400 fp=0xffff92fb65ec2ae8 Redzone ffff92fb65ec2570: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ Object ffff92fb65ec2578: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec2588: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec2598: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec25a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec25b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec25c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec25d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object ffff92fb65ec25e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. Redzone ffff92fb65ec25f8: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ Padding ffff92fb65ec2738: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ CPU: 3 PID: 180 Comm: kworker/3:2 Tainted: G BU 4.10.0-rc6-patser+ #5039 Hardware name: /NUC5PPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0031.2015.0601.1712 06/01/2015 Workqueue: events intel_atomic_helper_free_state [i915] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x4d/0x6d print_trailer+0x20c/0x220 free_debug_processing+0x1c6/0x330 ? drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0xf7/0x1c0 [drm] __slab_free+0x48/0x2e0 ? drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0xf7/0x1c0 [drm] kfree+0x159/0x1a0 drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0xf7/0x1c0 [drm] ? drm_atomic_state_clear+0x30/0x30 [drm] intel_atomic_state_clear+0xd/0x20 [i915] drm_atomic_state_clear+0x1a/0x30 [drm] __drm_atomic_state_free+0x13/0x60 [drm] intel_atomic_helper_free_state+0x5d/0x70 [i915] process_one_work+0x260/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x2d1/0x4f0 kthread+0x127/0x130 ? process_one_work+0x4a0/0x4a0 ? kthread_stop+0x120/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x40 FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffff92fb65ec2578 not freed Fixes: 3b24f7d67581 ("drm/atomic: Add struct drm_crtc_commit to track async updates") Fixes: 9626014258a5 ("drm/fence: add in-fences support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1485854725-27640-1-git-send-email-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/tc_act/tc_tunnel_key.h')