/* * Naive system call dropper built on seccomp_filter. * * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors * Author: Will Drewry * * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose, * and can serve as a starting point for developing * applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...). * * When run, returns the specified errno for the specified * system call number against the given architecture. * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int install_filter(int nr, int arch, int error) { struct sock_filter filter[] = { BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, arch, 0, 3), BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(error & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), }; struct sock_fprog prog = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])), .filter = filter, }; if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)"); return 1; } if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) { perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)"); return 1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { if (argc < 5) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n" "dropper []\n" "Hint: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n" " AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n" "\n", AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64); return 1; } if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0), strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0), strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0))) return 1; execv(argv[4], &argv[4]); printf("Failed to execv\n"); return 255; } it.cgi/linux/net-next.git/commit/include/dt-bindings/dma?id=3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7'>commitdiff
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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2017-01-03 14:18:43 +1300
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2017-01-10 13:34:43 +1300
commit3895dbf8985f656675b5bde610723a29cbce3fa7 (patch)
tree91d4517f09918fd573998eb40b8f35f08ed1c470 /include/dt-bindings/dma
parent0c744ea4f77d72b3dcebb7a8f2684633ec79be88 (diff)
mnt: Protect the mountpoint hashtable with mount_lock
Protecting the mountpoint hashtable with namespace_sem was sufficient until a call to umount_mnt was added to mntput_no_expire. At which point it became possible for multiple calls of put_mountpoint on the same hash chain to happen on the same time. Kristen Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> reported: > This can cause a panic when simultaneous callers of put_mountpoint > attempt to free the same mountpoint. This occurs because some callers > hold the mount_hash_lock, while others hold the namespace lock. Some > even hold both. > > In this submitter's case, the panic manifested itself as a GP fault in > put_mountpoint() when it called hlist_del() and attempted to dereference > a m_hash.pprev that had been poisioned by another thread. Al Viro observed that the simple fix is to switch from using the namespace_sem to the mount_lock to protect the mountpoint hash table. I have taken Al's suggested patch moved put_mountpoint in pivot_root (instead of taking mount_lock an additional time), and have replaced new_mountpoint with get_mountpoint a function that does the hash table lookup and addition under the mount_lock. The introduction of get_mounptoint ensures that only the mount_lock is needed to manipulate the mountpoint hashtable. d_set_mounted is modified to only set DCACHE_MOUNTED if it is not already set. This allows get_mountpoint to use the setting of DCACHE_MOUNTED to ensure adding a struct mountpoint for a dentry happens exactly once. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ce07d891a089 ("mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts") Reported-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/dt-bindings/dma')