/* * AppArmor security module * * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. */ #include #include #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/policy.h" const char *const op_table[] = { "null", "sysctl", "capable", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mknod", "truncate", "link", "symlink", "rename_src", "rename_dest", "chmod", "chown", "getattr", "open", "file_perm", "file_lock", "file_mmap", "file_mprotect", "create", "post_create", "bind", "connect", "listen", "accept", "sendmsg", "recvmsg", "getsockname", "getpeername", "getsockopt", "setsockopt", "socket_shutdown", "ptrace", "exec", "change_hat", "change_profile", "change_onexec", "setprocattr", "setrlimit", "profile_replace", "profile_load", "profile_remove" }; const char *const audit_mode_names[] = { "normal", "quiet_denied", "quiet", "noquiet", "all" }; static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { "AUDIT", "ALLOWED", "DENIED", "HINT", "STATUS", "ERROR", "KILLED", "AUTO" }; /* * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework. * * TODO: * netlink interface for complain mode * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log */ /** * audit_base - core AppArmor function. * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) * * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa */ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) { struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]); } if (sa->aad->op) { audit_log_format(ab, " operation="); audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]); } if (sa->aad->info) { audit_log_format(ab, " info="); audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info); if (sa->aad->error) audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error); } if (sa->aad->profile) { struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile; if (profile->ns != root_ns) { audit_log_format(ab, " namespace="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname); } audit_log_format(ab, " profile="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); } if (sa->aad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name); } } /** * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) */ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { sa->aad->type = type; common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb); } /** * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem * @type: audit type for the message * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) * @gfp: allocation flags to use * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) * * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags * * Returns: error on failure */ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, struct common_audit_data *sa, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { BUG_ON(!profile); if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; else type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; } if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET)) return sa->aad->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; if (!unconfined(profile)) sa->aad->profile = profile; aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current); if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) return complain_error(sa->aad->error); return sa->aad->error; } <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>2017-02-01 17:45:02 +0000 committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-02-01 21:17:49 +0100 commitc8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92 (patch) treed53fbdac9d0781e39a13b2ac6b2bd258cf3b4140 /net/ipv6/Kconfig parentbf29bddf0417a4783da3b24e8c9e017ac649326f (diff)
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(), after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported. Commit: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices(). Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses, manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults. So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better place for it anyway) Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code (i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally safe. Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/Kconfig')