/* * AppArmor security module * * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. */ #include #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/context.h" #include "include/resource.h" #include "include/policy.h" /* * Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h. */ #include "rlim_names.h" struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[] = { AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK), { } }; /* audit callback for resource specific fields */ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max); } /** * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) * @resoure: rlimit being auditing * @value: value being set * @error: error value * * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure */ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, unsigned long value, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, aad.rlim.rlim = resource; aad.rlim.max = value; aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); } /** * aa_map_resouce - map compiled policy resource to internal # * @resource: flattened policy resource number * * Returns: resource # for the current architecture. * * rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy * resource # to the internal representation for the architecture. */ int aa_map_resource(int resource) { return rlim_map[resource]; } /** * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit * @profile - profile confining the task (NOT NULL) * @task - task the resource is being set on * @resource - the resource being set * @new_rlim - the new resource limit (NOT NULL) * * Control raising the processes hard limit. * * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed */ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct aa_profile *task_profile; int error = 0; rcu_read_lock(); task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task))); rcu_read_unlock(); /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current) * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. */ if ((profile != task_profile && aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) || (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)) error = -EACCES; aa_put_profile(task_profile); return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error); } /** * __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits * @old: old profile on task (NOT NULL) * @new: new profile with rlimits to apply (NOT NULL) */ void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new) { unsigned int mask = 0; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int i; /* for any rlimits the profile controlled reset the soft limit * to the less of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit */ if (old->rlimits.mask) { for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } } } /* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */ if (!new->rlimits.mask) return; for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask)) continue; rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max, new->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max); /* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max); } }
authorArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>2017-02-01 17:45:02 +0000
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-02-01 21:17:49 +0100
commitc8f325a59cfc718d13a50fbc746ed9b415c25e92 (patch)
treed53fbdac9d0781e39a13b2ac6b2bd258cf3b4140 /include/net/sock.h
parentbf29bddf0417a4783da3b24e8c9e017ac649326f (diff)
efi/fdt: Avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices()
Some AArch64 UEFI implementations disable the MMU in ExitBootServices(), after which unaligned accesses to RAM are no longer supported. Commit: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") fixed an issue in the memory map handling of the stub FDT code, but inadvertently created an issue with such firmware, by moving some of the FDT manipulation to after the invocation of ExitBootServices(). Given that the stub's libfdt implementation uses the ordinary, accelerated string functions, which rely on hardware handling of unaligned accesses, manipulating the FDT with the MMU off may result in alignment faults. So fix the situation by moving the update_fdt_memmap() call into the callback function invoked by efi_exit_boot_services() right before it calls the ExitBootServices() UEFI service (which is arguably a better place for it anyway) Note that disabling the MMU in ExitBootServices() is not compliant with the UEFI spec, and carries great risk due to the fact that switching from cached to uncached memory accesses halfway through compiler generated code (i.e., involving a stack) can never be done in a way that is architecturally safe. Fixes: abfb7b686a3e ("efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: leif.lindholm@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485971102-23330-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/sock.h')