/* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * * Author : Stephen Smalley, */ #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "flask.h" #include "av_permissions.h" #include "security.h" #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP extern int selinux_enforcing; #else #define selinux_enforcing 1 #endif /* * An entry in the AVC. */ struct avc_entry; struct task_struct; struct inode; struct sock; struct sk_buff; /* * AVC statistics */ struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned int lookups; unsigned int misses; unsigned int allocations; unsigned int reclaims; unsigned int frees; }; /* * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message. */ struct selinux_audit_data { u32 ssid; u32 tsid; u16 tclass; u32 requested; u32 audited; u32 denied; int result; }; /* * AVC operations */ void __init avc_init(void); static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, u32 auditdeny, u32 *deniedp) { u32 denied, audited; denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; if (unlikely(denied)) { audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; /* * auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets * assume: * * denied == READ * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 * * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for * ACCESS */ if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) audited = 0; } else if (result) audited = denied = requested; else audited = requested & avd->auditallow; *deniedp = denied; return audited; } int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags); /** * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions * @avd: access vector decisions * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit * @a: auxiliary audit data * @flags: VFS walk flags * * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance * with the policy. This function is typically called by * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released * before calling the auditing code. */ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, int flags) { u32 audited, denied; audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return 0; return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, audited, denied, result, a, flags); } #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ #define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, unsigned flags, struct av_decision *avd); int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata); int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata, int flags); int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad); u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1 #define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2 #define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4 #define AVC_CALLBACK_RESET 8 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE 16 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 #define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events); /* Exported to selinuxfs */ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page); extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold; /* Attempt to free avc node cache */ void avc_disable(void); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats); #endif #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_H_ */ uai8.com>2017-01-20 21:40:43 +0800 committerPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2017-02-02 14:30:19 +0100 commit10435c1192d06bdb0bac7666452d8219d7e7c477 (patch) tree93b76419142fe17b1d162d062c663297a3e8a965 /include/dt-bindings/pinctrl/qcom,pmic-mpp.h parent1a28ad74ebd8f9d3c7eae0d781f72a6d30545e17 (diff)
netfilter: nf_tables: Eliminate duplicated code in nf_tables_table_enable()
If something fails in nf_tables_table_enable(), it unregisters the chains. But the rollback code is the same as nf_tables_table_disable() almostly, except there is one counter check. Now create one wrapper function to eliminate the duplicated codes. Signed-off-by: Feng <fgao@ikuai8.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/dt-bindings/pinctrl/qcom,pmic-mpp.h')