diff options
author | Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> | 2013-07-11 10:47:50 +0200 |
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committer | Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> | 2013-07-11 10:47:50 +0200 |
commit | 2b0325975aa3439f47f22211ffcc0bf2d3d8edcb (patch) | |
tree | b4a387bd16738961f23b7c112c1a241b2280bd7c /curvetun_mgmt_users.c | |
parent | 760f5b49a49c4b244a2da06a4123f884d891f8f6 (diff) |
curvetun: renamed client, server, and management files
Rename those files so that they are conform to the rest of the files
we have in our repository.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'curvetun_mgmt_users.c')
-rw-r--r-- | curvetun_mgmt_users.c | 760 |
1 files changed, 760 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/curvetun_mgmt_users.c b/curvetun_mgmt_users.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..665ceb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/curvetun_mgmt_users.c @@ -0,0 +1,760 @@ +/* + * netsniff-ng - the packet sniffing beast + * Copyright 2011 Daniel Borkmann. + * Subject to the GPL, version 2. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <syslog.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <arpa/inet.h> + +#include "die.h" +#include "locking.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ioexact.h" +#include "ioops.h" +#include "str.h" +#include "curvetun.h" +#include "curve.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "curvetun_mgmt_users.h" +#include "hash.h" + +struct user_store { + char username[256]; + unsigned char publickey[crypto_box_pub_key_size]; + struct curve25519_proto proto_inf; + struct user_store *next; +}; + +struct sock_map_entry { + int fd; + struct curve25519_proto *proto; + struct sock_map_entry *next; +}; + +struct sockaddr_map_entry { + struct sockaddr_storage *sa; + size_t sa_len; + struct curve25519_proto *proto; + struct sockaddr_map_entry *next; +}; + +static struct user_store *store = NULL; +static struct rwlock store_lock; + +static struct hash_table sock_mapper; +static struct rwlock sock_map_lock; + +static struct hash_table sockaddr_mapper; +static struct rwlock sockaddr_map_lock; + +static unsigned char token[crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_KEYBYTES]; + +static void init_sock_mapper(void) +{ + rwlock_init(&sock_map_lock); + + rwlock_wr_lock(&sock_map_lock); + + memset(&sock_mapper, 0, sizeof(sock_mapper)); + init_hash(&sock_mapper); + + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); +} + +static void init_sockaddr_mapper(void) +{ + rwlock_init(&sockaddr_map_lock); + rwlock_wr_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + memset(&sockaddr_mapper, 0, sizeof(sockaddr_mapper)); + init_hash(&sockaddr_mapper); + + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); +} + +static int cleanup_batch_sock_mapper(void *ptr) +{ + struct sock_map_entry *next; + struct sock_map_entry *e = ptr; + + if (!e) + return 0; + + while ((next = e->next)) { + e->next = NULL; + xfree(e); + e = next; + } + + xfree(e); + + return 0; +} + +static void destroy_sock_mapper(void) +{ + rwlock_wr_lock(&sock_map_lock); + for_each_hash(&sock_mapper, cleanup_batch_sock_mapper); + free_hash(&sock_mapper); + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); + + rwlock_destroy(&sock_map_lock); +} + +static int cleanup_batch_sockaddr_mapper(void *ptr) +{ + struct sockaddr_map_entry *next; + struct sockaddr_map_entry *e = ptr; + + if (!e) + return 0; + + while ((next = e->next)) { + e->next = NULL; + xfree(e); + e = next; + } + + xfree(e); + return 0; +} + +static void destroy_sockaddr_mapper(void) +{ + rwlock_wr_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + for_each_hash(&sockaddr_mapper, cleanup_batch_sockaddr_mapper); + free_hash(&sockaddr_mapper); + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + rwlock_destroy(&sockaddr_map_lock); +} + +static struct user_store *user_store_alloc(void) +{ + return xzmalloc(sizeof(struct user_store)); +} + +static void user_store_free(struct user_store *us) +{ + if (!us) + return; + memset(us, 0, sizeof(struct user_store)); + xfree(us); +} + +/* already in lock */ +static int __check_duplicate_username(char *username, size_t len) +{ + int duplicate = 0; + struct user_store *elem = store; + + while (elem) { + if (!memcmp(elem->username, username, + strlen(elem->username) + 1)) { + duplicate = 1; + break; + } + elem = elem->next; + } + + return duplicate; +} + +/* already in lock */ +static int __check_duplicate_pubkey(unsigned char *pubkey, size_t len) +{ + int duplicate = 0; + struct user_store *elem = store; + + while (elem) { + if (!memcmp(elem->publickey, pubkey, + sizeof(elem->publickey))) { + duplicate = 1; + break; + } + elem = elem->next; + } + + return duplicate; +} + +enum parse_states { + PARSE_USERNAME, + PARSE_PUBKEY, + PARSE_DONE, +}; + +static int parse_line(char *line, char *homedir) +{ + char *str; + enum parse_states s = PARSE_USERNAME; + struct user_store *elem; + unsigned char pkey[crypto_box_pub_key_size]; + + elem = user_store_alloc(); + elem->next = store; + + str = strtok(line, ";"); + for (; str != NULL;) { + switch (s) { + case PARSE_USERNAME: + if (__check_duplicate_username(str, strlen(str) + 1)) + return -EINVAL; + strlcpy(elem->username, str, sizeof(elem->username)); + s = PARSE_PUBKEY; + break; + case PARSE_PUBKEY: + if (!curve25519_pubkey_hexparse_32(pkey, sizeof(pkey), + str, strlen(str))) + return -EINVAL; + if (__check_duplicate_pubkey(pkey, sizeof(pkey))) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(elem->publickey, pkey, sizeof(elem->publickey)); + curve25519_proto_init(&elem->proto_inf, elem->publickey, sizeof(elem->publickey)); + s = PARSE_DONE; + break; + case PARSE_DONE: + break; + default: + return -EIO; + } + + str = strtok(NULL, ";"); + } + + store = elem; + return s == PARSE_DONE ? 0 : -EIO; +} + +void parse_userfile_and_generate_user_store_or_die(char *homedir) +{ + FILE *fp; + char path[PATH_MAX], buff[512]; + int line = 1, ret, fd; + + memset(path, 0, sizeof(path)); + slprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", homedir, FILE_CLIENTS); + + rwlock_init(&store_lock); + rwlock_wr_lock(&store_lock); + + fp = fopen(path, "r"); + if (!fp) + panic("Cannot open client file!\n"); + + memset(buff, 0, sizeof(buff)); + while (fgets(buff, sizeof(buff), fp) != NULL) { + buff[sizeof(buff) - 1] = 0; + /* A comment. Skip this line */ + if (buff[0] == '#' || buff[0] == '\n') { + memset(buff, 0, sizeof(buff)); + line++; + continue; + } + + ret = parse_line(buff, homedir); + if (ret < 0) + panic("Cannot parse line %d from clients!\n", line); + line++; + memset(buff, 0, sizeof(buff)); + } + + fclose(fp); + + if (store == NULL) + panic("No registered clients found!\n"); + + rwlock_unlock(&store_lock); + + init_sock_mapper(); + init_sockaddr_mapper(); + + /* + * Pubkey is also used as a hmac of the initial packet to check + * the integrity of the packet, so that we know if it's just random + * garbage or a 'valid' packet. Again, just for the integrity! + */ + + memset(path, 0, sizeof(path)); + slprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", homedir, FILE_PUBKEY); + + fd = open_or_die(path, O_RDONLY); + ret = read(fd, token, sizeof(token)); + if (ret != crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_KEYBYTES) + panic("Cannot read public key!\n"); + close(fd); +} + +void dump_user_store(void) +{ + int i; + struct user_store *elem; + + rwlock_rd_lock(&store_lock); + + elem = store; + while (elem) { + printf("%s -> ", elem->username); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(elem->publickey); ++i) + if (i == (sizeof(elem->publickey) - 1)) + printf("%02x\n", (unsigned char) + elem->publickey[i]); + else + printf("%02x:", (unsigned char) + elem->publickey[i]); + elem = elem->next; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&store_lock); +} + +void destroy_user_store(void) +{ + struct user_store *elem, *nelem = NULL; + + rwlock_wr_lock(&store_lock); + + elem = store; + while (elem) { + nelem = elem->next; + elem->next = NULL; + user_store_free(elem); + elem = nelem; + } + rwlock_unlock(&store_lock); + + rwlock_destroy(&store_lock); + + destroy_sock_mapper(); + destroy_sockaddr_mapper(); +} + +int username_msg(char *username, size_t len, char *dst, size_t dlen) +{ + int fd; + ssize_t ret; + uint32_t salt; + unsigned char h[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; + struct username_struct *us = (struct username_struct *) dst; + char *uname; + size_t uname_len; + + if (dlen < sizeof(struct username_struct)) + return -ENOMEM; + + uname_len = 512; + uname = xzmalloc(uname_len); + + fd = open_or_die("/dev/random", O_RDONLY); + ret = read_exact(fd, &salt, sizeof(salt), 0); + if (ret != sizeof(salt)) + panic("Cannot read from /dev/random!\n"); + close(fd); + + slprintf(uname, uname_len, "%s%u", username, salt); + crypto_hash_sha512(h, (unsigned char *) uname, strlen(uname)); + + us->salt = htonl(salt); + memcpy(us->hash, h, sizeof(us->hash)); + + xfree(uname); + return 0; +} + +enum is_user_enum username_msg_is_user(char *src, size_t slen, char *username, + size_t len) +{ + char *uname; + size_t uname_len; + uint32_t salt; + struct username_struct *us = (struct username_struct *) src; + unsigned char h[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; + + if (slen < sizeof(struct username_struct)) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return USERNAMES_ERR; + } + + uname_len = 512; + uname = xzmalloc(uname_len); + + salt = ntohl(us->salt); + + slprintf(uname, uname_len, "%s%u", username, salt); + crypto_hash_sha512(h, (unsigned char *) uname, strlen(uname)); + xfree(uname); + + if (!crypto_verify_32(&h[0], &us->hash[0]) && + !crypto_verify_32(&h[32], &us->hash[32])) + return USERNAMES_OK; + else + return USERNAMES_NE; +} + +static int register_user_by_socket(int fd, struct curve25519_proto *proto) +{ + void **pos; + struct sock_map_entry *entry; + + rwlock_wr_lock(&sock_map_lock); + + entry = xzmalloc(sizeof(*entry)); + entry->fd = fd; + entry->proto = proto; + + pos = insert_hash(entry->fd, entry, &sock_mapper); + if (pos) { + entry->next = (*pos); + (*pos) = entry; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); + + return 0; +} + +static int register_user_by_sockaddr(struct sockaddr_storage *sa, + size_t sa_len, + struct curve25519_proto *proto) +{ + void **pos; + struct sockaddr_map_entry *entry; + unsigned int hash = hash_name((char *) sa, sa_len); + + rwlock_wr_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + entry = xzmalloc(sizeof(*entry)); + entry->sa = xmemdupz(sa, sa_len); + entry->sa_len = sa_len; + entry->proto = proto; + + pos = insert_hash(hash, entry, &sockaddr_mapper); + if (pos) { + entry->next = (*pos); + (*pos) = entry; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + return 0; +} + +int try_register_user_by_socket(struct curve25519_struct *c, + char *src, size_t slen, int sock, int log) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *cbuff = NULL; + size_t real_len = 132; + ssize_t clen; + struct user_store *elem; + enum is_user_enum err; + unsigned char auth[crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_BYTES]; + struct taia arrival_taia; + + /* assert(132 == clen + sizeof(auth)); */ + /* + * Check hmac first, if malicious, drop immediately before we + * investigate more efforts. + */ + if (slen < real_len) + return -1; + + taia_now(&arrival_taia); + + memcpy(auth, src, sizeof(auth)); + + src += sizeof(auth); + real_len -= sizeof(auth); + + if (crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_verify(auth, (unsigned char *) src, + real_len, token)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Bad packet hmac for id %d! Dropping!\n", sock); + return -1; + } else { + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Good packet hmac for id %d!\n", sock); + } + + rwlock_rd_lock(&store_lock); + + elem = store; + while (elem) { + clen = curve25519_decode(c, &elem->proto_inf, + (unsigned char *) src, real_len, + (unsigned char **) &cbuff, + &arrival_taia); + if (clen <= 0) { + elem = elem->next; + continue; + } + + cbuff += crypto_box_zerobytes; + clen -= crypto_box_zerobytes; + + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Packet decoded successfully for id %d!\n", sock); + + err = username_msg_is_user(cbuff, clen, elem->username, + strlen(elem->username) + 1); + if (err == USERNAMES_OK) { + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Found user %s for id %d! Registering ...\n", + elem->username, sock); + ret = register_user_by_socket(sock, &elem->proto_inf); + break; + } + + elem = elem->next; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&store_lock); + + if (ret == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "User not found! Dropping connection!\n"); + + return ret; +} + +int try_register_user_by_sockaddr(struct curve25519_struct *c, + char *src, size_t slen, + struct sockaddr_storage *sa, + size_t sa_len, int log) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *cbuff = NULL; + struct user_store *elem; + ssize_t clen; + size_t real_len = 132; + enum is_user_enum err; + unsigned char auth[crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_BYTES]; + struct taia arrival_taia; + + /* assert(132 == clen + sizeof(auth)); */ + /* + * Check hmac first, if malicious, drop immediately before we + * investigate more efforts. + */ + if (slen < real_len) + return -1; + + taia_now(&arrival_taia); + + memcpy(auth, src, sizeof(auth)); + + src += sizeof(auth); + real_len -= sizeof(auth); + + if (crypto_auth_hmacsha512256_verify(auth, (unsigned char *) src, + real_len, token)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Got bad packet hmac! Dropping!\n"); + return -1; + } else { + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Got good packet hmac!\n"); + } + + rwlock_rd_lock(&store_lock); + + elem = store; + while (elem) { + clen = curve25519_decode(c, &elem->proto_inf, + (unsigned char *) src, real_len, + (unsigned char **) &cbuff, + &arrival_taia); + if (clen <= 0) { + elem = elem->next; + continue; + } + + cbuff += crypto_box_zerobytes; + clen -= crypto_box_zerobytes; + + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Packet decoded successfully!\n"); + + err = username_msg_is_user(cbuff, clen, elem->username, + strlen(elem->username) + 1); + if (err == USERNAMES_OK) { + if (log) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "Found user %s! Registering ...\n", + elem->username); + ret = register_user_by_sockaddr(sa, sa_len, + &elem->proto_inf); + break; + } + + elem = elem->next; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&store_lock); + + if (ret == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "User not found! Dropping connection!\n"); + + return ret; +} + +int get_user_by_socket(int fd, struct curve25519_proto **proto) +{ + int ret = -1; + struct sock_map_entry *entry; + + errno = 0; + + rwlock_rd_lock(&sock_map_lock); + + entry = lookup_hash(fd, &sock_mapper); + while (entry && fd != entry->fd) + entry = entry->next; + if (entry && fd == entry->fd) { + (*proto) = entry->proto; + ret = 0; + } else { + (*proto) = NULL; + errno = ENOENT; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); + + return ret; +} + +int get_user_by_sockaddr(struct sockaddr_storage *sa, size_t sa_len, + struct curve25519_proto **proto) +{ + int ret = -1; + struct sockaddr_map_entry *entry; + unsigned int hash = hash_name((char *) sa, sa_len); + + errno = 0; + + rwlock_rd_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + entry = lookup_hash(hash, &sockaddr_mapper); + while (entry && entry->sa_len == sa_len && + memcmp(sa, entry->sa, entry->sa_len)) + entry = entry->next; + if (entry && entry->sa_len == sa_len && + !memcmp(sa, entry->sa, entry->sa_len)) { + (*proto) = entry->proto; + ret = 0; + } else { + (*proto) = NULL; + errno = ENOENT; + } + + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + return ret; +} + +static struct sock_map_entry *socket_to_sock_map_entry(int fd) +{ + struct sock_map_entry *entry, *ret = NULL; + + errno = 0; + + rwlock_rd_lock(&sock_map_lock); + + entry = lookup_hash(fd, &sock_mapper); + while (entry && fd != entry->fd) + entry = entry->next; + if (entry && fd == entry->fd) + ret = entry; + else + errno = ENOENT; + + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); + + return ret; +} + +void remove_user_by_socket(int fd) +{ + struct sock_map_entry *pos; + struct sock_map_entry *entry = socket_to_sock_map_entry(fd); + + if (!entry) + return; + + rwlock_wr_lock(&sock_map_lock); + + pos = remove_hash(entry->fd, entry, entry->next, &sock_mapper); + while (pos && pos->next && pos->next != entry) + pos = pos->next; + if (pos && pos->next && pos->next == entry) + pos->next = entry->next; + + memset(entry->proto->enonce, 0, sizeof(entry->proto->enonce)); + memset(entry->proto->dnonce, 0, sizeof(entry->proto->dnonce)); + + entry->proto = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + + xfree(entry); + + rwlock_unlock(&sock_map_lock); +} + +static struct sockaddr_map_entry * +sockaddr_to_sockaddr_map_entry(struct sockaddr_storage *sa, size_t sa_len) +{ + struct sockaddr_map_entry *entry, *ret = NULL; + unsigned int hash = hash_name((char *) sa, sa_len); + + errno = 0; + + rwlock_rd_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + entry = lookup_hash(hash, &sockaddr_mapper); + while (entry && entry->sa_len == sa_len && + memcmp(sa, entry->sa, entry->sa_len)) + entry = entry->next; + if (entry && entry->sa_len == sa_len && + !memcmp(sa, entry->sa, entry->sa_len)) + ret = entry; + else + errno = ENOENT; + + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + return ret; +} + +void remove_user_by_sockaddr(struct sockaddr_storage *sa, size_t sa_len) +{ + struct sockaddr_map_entry *pos; + struct sockaddr_map_entry *entry; + unsigned int hash = hash_name((char *) sa, sa_len); + + entry = sockaddr_to_sockaddr_map_entry(sa, sa_len); + if (!entry) + return; + + rwlock_wr_lock(&sockaddr_map_lock); + + pos = remove_hash(hash, entry, entry->next, &sockaddr_mapper); + while (pos && pos->next && pos->next != entry) + pos = pos->next; + if (pos && pos->next && pos->next == entry) + pos->next = entry->next; + + memset(entry->proto->enonce, 0, sizeof(entry->proto->enonce)); + memset(entry->proto->dnonce, 0, sizeof(entry->proto->dnonce)); + + entry->proto = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + + xfree(entry->sa); + xfree(entry); + + rwlock_unlock(&sockaddr_map_lock); +} |