/* * netsniff-ng - the packet sniffing beast * Copyright 2009, 2010 Daniel Borkmann. * Copyright 2013 Tobias Klauser. * Subject to the GPL, version 2. */ #define _BSD_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include "tprintf.h" #include "die.h" #include "locking.h" #include "built_in.h" #define term_trailing_size 5 #define term_starting_size 3 #define term_curr_size (get_tty_size() - term_trailing_size) static char buffer[1024]; static volatile size_t buffer_use = 0; static struct spinlock buffer_lock; static int get_tty_size(void) { #ifdef TIOCGSIZE struct ttysize ts = {0}; return (ioctl(0, TIOCGSIZE, &ts) == 0 ? ts.ts_cols : DEFAULT_TTY_SIZE); #elif defined(TIOCGWINSZ) struct winsize ts; return (ioctl(0, TIOCGWINSZ, &ts) == 0 ? ts.ws_col : DEFAULT_TTY_SIZE); #else return DEFAULT_TTY_SIZE; #endif } static inline void __tprintf_flush_newline(void) { int i; fputc('\n', stdout); for (i = 0; i < term_starting_size; ++i) fputc(' ', stdout); } static inline int __tprintf_flush_skip(char *buf, int i) { int val = buf[i]; if (val == ' ' || val == ',') return 1; return 0; } static void __tprintf_flush(void) { size_t i; static ssize_t line_count = 0; ssize_t term_len = term_curr_size; for (i = 0; i < buffer_use; ++i) { if (buffer[i] == '\n') { term_len = term_curr_size; line_count = -1; } if (line_count == term_len) { __tprintf_flush_newline(); line_count = term_starting_size; while (i < buffer_use && __tprintf_flush_skip(buffer, i)) i++; } fputc(buffer[i], stdout); line_count++; } fflush(stdout); buffer_use = 0; } void tprintf_flush(void) { spinlock_lock(&buffer_lock); __tprintf_flush(); spinlock_unlock(&buffer_lock); } void tprintf_init(void) { spinlock_init(&buffer_lock); setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0); } void tprintf_cleanup(void) { tprintf_flush(); spinlock_destroy(&buffer_lock); } void tprintf(char *msg, ...) { ssize_t ret; ssize_t avail; va_list vl; spinlock_lock(&buffer_lock); avail = sizeof(buffer) - buffer_use; bug_on(avail < 0); va_start(vl, msg); ret = vsnprintf(buffer + buffer_use, avail, msg, vl); va_end(vl); if (ret < 0) panic("vsnprintf screwed up in tprintf!\n"); if ((size_t) ret > sizeof(buffer)) panic("No mem in tprintf left!\n"); if (ret >= avail) { __tprintf_flush(); avail = sizeof(buffer) - buffer_use; bug_on(avail < 0); va_start(vl, msg); ret = vsnprintf(buffer + buffer_use, avail, msg, vl); va_end(vl); if (ret < 0) panic("vsnprintf screwed up in tprintf!\n"); } buffer_use += ret; spinlock_unlock(&buffer_lock); } void tputchar_safe(int c) { unsigned char ch = (unsigned char)(c & 0xff); if (isprint(ch)) tprintf("%c", ch); else tprintf("\\0x%02x", ch); } void tputs_safe(const char *str, size_t len) { while (len--) { tputchar_safe(*str); str++; } } ue='5'>5space:mode:
authorChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>2016-11-08 17:15:05 -0800
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2016-11-09 08:25:10 +0100
commit402723ad5c625ee052432698ae5e56b02d38d4ec (patch)
treeac5eab5d6638f13c289287aef2016bdacb1bba21
parent61e1c5905290efe48bacda5e342d4af4cb1b923b (diff)
PCI/MSI: Provide pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity()
This is a variant of pci_alloc_irq_vectors() that allows passing a struct irq_affinity to provide fine-grained IRQ affinity control. For now this means being able to exclude vectors at the beginning or end of the MSI vector space, but it could also be used for any other quirks needed in the future (e.g. more vectors than CPUs, or excluding CPUs from the spreading). Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478654107-7384-6-git-send-email-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>