/* * netsniff-ng - the packet sniffing beast * Copyright 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Daniel Borkmann. * Subject to the GPL, version 2. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "built_in.h" #include "die.h" #include "str.h" void *xmalloc(size_t size) { void *ptr; if (unlikely(size == 0)) panic("xmalloc: zero size\n"); ptr = malloc(size); if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) panic("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)\n", size); return ptr; } void *xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *ptr; if (unlikely(nmemb == 0 || size == 0)) panic("xcalloc: zero size\n"); ptr = calloc(nmemb, size); if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) panic("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu members of " "%zu bytes)\n", nmemb, size); return ptr; } void *xzmalloc(size_t size) { void *ptr = xmalloc(size); memset(ptr, 0, size); return ptr; } void *xmalloc_aligned(size_t size, size_t alignment) { int ret; void *ptr; if (unlikely(size == 0)) panic("xmalloc_aligned: zero size\n"); ret = posix_memalign(&ptr, alignment, size); if (unlikely(ret != 0)) panic("xmalloc_aligned: out of memory (allocating %zu " "bytes)\n", size); return ptr; } void *xzmalloc_aligned(size_t size, size_t alignment) { void *ptr = xmalloc_aligned(size, alignment); memset(ptr, 0, size); return ptr; } void *xmallocz(size_t size) { void *ptr; if (unlikely(size + 1 < size)) panic("xmallocz: data too large to fit into virtual " "memory space\n"); ptr = xmalloc(size + 1); ((char*) ptr)[size] = 0; return ptr; } void *xmemdupz(const void *data, size_t len) { return memcpy(xmallocz(len), data, len); } void *xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; size_t new_size = nmemb * size; if (unlikely(new_size == 0)) panic("xrealloc: zero size\n"); if (unlikely(((size_t) ~0) / nmemb < size)) panic("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX\n"); if (ptr == NULL) new_ptr = malloc(new_size); else new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size); if (unlikely(new_ptr == NULL)) panic("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %zu bytes)\n", new_size); return new_ptr; } void xfree_func(void *ptr) { if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) panic("xfree: NULL pointer given as argument\n"); free(ptr); } char *xstrdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(cp, str, len); return cp; } char *xstrndup(const char *str, size_t size) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; if (size < len) len = size; cp = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(cp, str, len); return cp; } 84b357ddb18f4e3'>root/kernel/auditfilter.c
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authorChris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>2014-03-25 09:25:41 -0400
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2014-04-10 17:51:29 -0400
commit312103d64d0fcadb332899a2c84b357ddb18f4e3 (patch)
treec000c66645e669e13f96b305ef08748e81e90fb4 /kernel/auditfilter.c
parentab9705f34ce92b4f0da494859e69688e1e34e387 (diff)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
On systems with CONFIG_COMPAT we introduced the new requirement that audit_classify_compat_syscall() exists. This wasn't true for everything (apparently not for "tilegx", which I know less that nothing about.) Instead of wrapping the preprocessor optomization with CONFIG_COMPAT we should have used the new CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC. This patch uses that config option to make sure only arches which intend to implement this have the requirement. This works fine for tilegx according to Chris Metcalf Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')