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#ifndef RND_H
#define RND_H

#define HIG_ENTROPY_SOURCE	"/dev/random"
#define LOW_ENTROPY_SOURCE	"/dev/urandom"

/* secrand is not really secure, but the name only suggests it's better to use
 * than rand(3) when transferring bytes over the network in non-security
 * critical structure members. secrand() is only used to fill up salts actually.
 */
extern int secrand(void);
extern void gen_key_bytes(unsigned char *area, size_t len);

#endif /* RND_H */
o' class='commit-info'> authorEric Ren <zren@suse.com>2016-08-25 17:20:59 +0800 committerDavid Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>2016-08-26 13:22:14 -0500 commit079d37df3397d48aab0f014986c1b0a1ca6256aa (patch) treeee64358c7af2b4a5ffab8206ad41760ca5e829dc parentfa8410b355251fd30341662a40ac6b22d3e38468 (diff)
dlm: fix malfunction of dlm_tool caused by debugfs changes
With the current kernel, `dlm_tool lockdebug` fails as below: "dlm_tool lockdebug ED0BD86DCE724393918A1AE8FDBF1EE3 can't open /sys/kernel/debug/dlm/ED0BD86DCE724393918A1AE8FDBF1EE3: Operation not permitted" This is because table_open() depends on file->f_op to tell which seq_file ops should be passed down. But, the original file ops in file->f_op is replaced by "debugfs_full_proxy_file_operations" with commit 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data"). Currently, I can think up 2 solutions: 1st, replace debugfs_create_file() with debugfs_create_file_unsafe(); 2nd, make different table_open#() accordingly. The 1st one is neat, but I don't thoroughly understand its risk. Maybe someone has a better one. Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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