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#ifndef RND_H
#define RND_H

#define HIG_ENTROPY_SOURCE	"/dev/random"
#define LOW_ENTROPY_SOURCE	"/dev/urandom"

/* secrand is not really secure, but the name only suggests it's better to use
 * than rand(3) when transferring bytes over the network in non-security
 * critical structure members. secrand() is only used to fill up salts actually.
 */
extern int secrand(void);
extern void gen_key_bytes(unsigned char *area, size_t len);

#endif /* RND_H */
ange='this.form.submit();'>mode:
authorAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2016-12-16 13:42:06 -0500
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2016-12-22 23:03:42 -0500
commit128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 (patch)
tree025d426075681b9904895045929e322429b8a251 /include/uapi
parentf698cccbc89e33cda4795a375e47daaa3689485e (diff)
sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload; worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS. Bail out early if that happens. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi')